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INTRODUCTION
The securities laws clearly prohibit an executive from using nonpublic
information about her company to profit from trades in the securities of that
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company. But suppose the executive uses the same nonpublic information to
profit from trading in the stock of another company. Suppose, for example,
that an executive of Intel learns that her company will report higher than
expected earnings because of higher than expected chip demand. Can she
profit from this knowledge by purchasing the stock of other companies that she
knows are likely to benefit from the same increased demand? For example, can
she purchase the market basket of companies (other than Intel) that compose
the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index? The stock of personal computer
manufacturers or retailers? The stock of software companies whose products
are complementary with personal computer sales? Under the right
circumstances, such companies can all be thought of as stock substitutes for
Intel. A strategy of trading in stock substitutes with nonpublic knowledge of
Intel earnings will produce a supranormal return.
Profits from such trading can be substantial. To cite but one example, Intel
on November 10, 1998 did in fact report higher than expected quarterly
demand (by 4% or so) for its microprocessor. On the day following the
announcement, Intel's stock rose about 5%, for a rise in market value of about
$7 billion. Intel's announcement was interpreted in the financial press as
indicating strong demand for personal computers generally. The stock of other
companies in that industry, and the market baskets of stocks in that industry
(such as the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index), rose between 2.5% and 5%.
The stock of Intel's downstream customer, Compaq, rose 4%, a dollar rise of
over $2 billion in market value. The price of short-term call options in Compaq
increased dramatically. 1 Analysis linked the increase in stock value of Compaq
and other companies to the increased demand for PCs, as suggested by Intel's
strong earnings report.
2
In this Article, we will focus on circumstances where an informed insider
(or a corporation itself) could trade profitably in its own stock but for Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5's 3 traditional prohibition on insider
trading. To avoid a clear-cut Rule lob-5 violation, the insider might instead
want to substitute trade in other stocks whose price will be predictably affected
by the same information.4 Such substitute trading could potentially take a
1. For example, November call option contracts to buy Compaq at $33 rose 19% on
that day. See infra Part I.B(analyzing change in larger basket of option contracts). But see
Steven M. Sears, Intel Corp. 's Options Get a Shot in the Arm from Forecast of Better-Than-
Expected Profit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1998, at C13 (reporting that Compaq's increase also
due, in part, to announcement that it would market computers directly to consumers).
2. hItel Shares Rise 6.3% to a Record, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 12, 1998, at B3.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-l (2000).
4. At other times, an employee (or a firm) itself will come upon a piece of nonpublic
information, which, while not related to its own stock, creates a profitable trading
opportunity in other companies' stock. While some of the Article's analysis is relevant to
such cross trades (see infra Part II.C.2), such cross trading is not literally a substitute for
prohibited insider trading. Informationally driven nonsubstitute trading instead raises issues
of when we should allow trading on the basis of nonpublic information (as is discussed in the
Nov. 200 1I]
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variety of forms. Particular types of information will cause the price of a stock
substitute to predictably move in the opposite direction of the price of one's
own company. Information that would make an insider want to buy shares of
his or her own company will sometimes induce the insider to want to sell
another company's shares. For example, if an insider of Genentech realizes
that Genentech is likely to win the race in cloning a particularly useful
monoclonal antibody, then selling rivals' stock short may be a close substitute
for buying Genentech shares long.
The impetus for substitute trading will not be limited to corporations that
sell substitute products. Supranormal returns may also be realized in trades on
the stock of upstream suppliers and downstream customers. For example, an
executive of Ford Motor Company may hear from her engineers nonpublic
information about an assembly-line robotic device tested by Ford but
manufactured by another company. Or substitute trading in the stock of
complementary products may become profitable. A corporation, rather than its
employees, may trade in stock substitutes. In the above examples, supranormal
profits may be available to Intel, Genentech, and Ford.
Substitute trading, if legal, could threaten to undermine the effectiveness of
insider trading prohibitions generally. Yet legal scholarship has not focused
squarely on the problem.5 In Part I of this Article, we examine the economics
section on Rule 14e). See id.
5. Trading in stock substitutes is mentioned in passing in a number of thoughtful legal
articles or reports on insider trading. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES
CODE § 1603 (1980) ("It would be convenient to have a new category of 'quasi-insider' that
would cover people like (i) judges' clerks who trade on information in published
opinions.., and perhaps (iv) persons who are about to give profitable supply contracts to
corporations with which they are not otherwise connected.... But all this does not lend
itself to definition. It is difficult in the abstract to opine even on illustrative cases."); see also
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of hIsider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 874 (1983) (observing that a key supplier of a firm could theoretically engage in
trading based on inside information just as a key executive within the firm could, and that
while the supplier's actions are not illegal under insider trading laws, the supplier's action
nonetheless creates the same moral hazard that the executive's action creates); Arthur
Fleischer, Jr., Robert H. Mundheim & John C. Murphy, Jr., An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 815-17 (1973)
(discussing the fairness under current securities law of an employee using nonpublic
information to purchase stock in a company that the employee's firm is considering buying a
controlling number of shares of). As two economists have written:
Though there is a large literature on the economic and legal aspects of insider trading, this
literature suffers from a serious omission: almost all attention has been focused on trading by
officers and directors of one corporation in that corporation's publicly traded securities.
[But] another likely type of insider trading is by officers and directors of one corporation
(Corporation A) in another corporation's (Corporation B) securities.
Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lot, Jr., Profiting from Induced Changes in Competitors'
Market Values: The Case of Entry and Entry Deterrence, 43 J. INDus. ECoN. 261, 261 (1995)
(footnote omitted); see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Classical and Cross Insider
Trading: Variations on the Theme of Rule 1Ob-5, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 109, 110-11 (1990)
(arguing that cross trading is more undesirable than classical insider trading); Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure
[Vol. 54:235
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of trading in stock substitutes. We summarize the literature on stock
correlations and review event studies that measure the effect that a public
announcement by one company has on other companies in the same industry.
We also discuss the "mechanics" of trading in stock substitutes to assess how
profitable such trading might be. A representative issue covered is how much
stock a trader could buy, as a percentage of daily volume or market
capitalization, without so moving price as to offset any informational
advantage.
In Part II, we examine the legality of trading in stock substitutes. Section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act6 has traditionally been interpreted to
prohibit an insider from using material nonpublic information to trade in her
own company's stock. An insider for this purpose would include the company
itself. Under this traditional interpretation, an insider could legally trade in
another company's stock. The rationale for this is that the insider is not a
fiduciary of the company whose stock she is trading and therefore owes no duty
to its shareholders. The reach of Section 10(b) has been extended under the so-
called "misappropriation" doctrine. Under this doctrine, a fiduciary who, in
violation of the confidence of her principal, uses information gleaned from her
role to profit from securities trading has violated Section 10(b). The
misappropriation doctrine requires a fiduciary relationship between the trader
and the source of the information; it does not require a fiduciary relationship
between the trader and the shareholder on the losing end of the trade.
How would the misappropriation doctrine affect trading in stock
substitutes? An employee is a fiduciary of her employer. If a company
explicitly prohibits its employees from using nonpublic information to trade in
another company's stock, an employee who violates that prohibition will
violate Section 10(b). If, on the other hand, a company explicitly permits its
employees to trade in another company's stock, an employee who trades will
not violate the confidence of her employer and will not run afoul of Section
10(b). The application of the doctrine in the (typical) case in which the
employment contract is silent as to the permissibility of trading in stock
substitutes is somewhat unclear; security lawyers would advise employees in
this situation not to trade. Significantly, the misappropriation doctrine will not
limit a company's use of its own nonpublic information to trade in another
company's stock. Such trading does not violate the confidence of any
fiduciary.
Part III discusses what can be gleaned about current corporate practice-
both concerning corporate policies regarding substitute trading and the extent to
which such informationally-driven trading occurs. Some companies-
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1, 14-16
(1993) (observing that trades by informed noninsiders does not give rise to insider trading
liability).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
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particularly in the securities industry-expressly prohibit their employees from
trading in stock substitutes. We have also uncovered a few examples of
companies that in the past have given employees explicit permission to trade in
stock substitutes. But most employment contracts are silent as to whether such
trading is permitted or prohibited. This finding is roughly consistent with what
we would expect. Stock substitute trading offers a form of compensation paid
for largely by the shareholders of another company; an employer who attempts
to limit this trading by contract would face difficult line-drawing issues and run
the risk of imposing criminal penalties on employees who approach those lines.
It is difficult to get even good anecdotal data on the degree of trading in stock
substitutes. Our best guess is that low-level employee trading is common, but
that large-scale corporate trading does not occur.
Part IV examines the desirability of trading in stock substitutes. We focus
on efficiency effects and first review the existing debate over insider trading,
that is, trading by a company in its own stock or trading by an employee in her
company's stock. (To avoid confusion, we will use the term "insider trading"
to describe this form of trading, and the term "trading in stock substitutes" to
describe a company or executive trading in another company's stock.)
Opponents of Section 10(b) liability argue that insider trading profits are best
viewed as a potential form of compensation to executives; if insider trading
were legalized, shareholder losses on trades with insiders would be offset by
shareholder gains from lower explicit pay to insiders. Insider trading would
produce a social good: more accurate stock pricing. In any event, since losses
from insider trading are internalized to the company and its shareholders, the
decision whether to permit such trading ought to be left to the company.
Supporters of the present law argue that insider trading distorts employee
incentives. We extend the analysis by pointing out another problem with
employee insider trading: It inefficiently ties the purchase of executive
services to the sale of trading rights. We conclude that employee insider
trading is presumptively inefficient. However, insider trading carried out by a
corporation, rather than its employees, may well be efficient.
We agree with a primary contention of opponents of the present law:
Efficiency gains and losses are internalized to each company, and focusing at
least on efficiency-related goals, the present no-trade rule might be made
elective, rather than mandatory. However, because a corporation's decision to
let its manager trade on material nonpublic fiduciary information is a
quintessentially self-interested transaction, the decision should be subjected to
the heightened procedural and substantive scrutiny that arises under the duty of
loyalty standard.
Trading in stock substitutes raises many of the same costs and benefits
issues as direct insider trading. Trading may distort incentives but lead to more
accurate stock prices; shareholders gain from lower explicit pay but lose on
trades. However, gains and losses in stock substitute trading are not
internalized by the company (and ultimately, the shareholders of the company)
[Vol. 54:235
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whose employees trade. Significantly, gains from trades accrue to the company
that trades, or whose employees trade, while losses are realized by shareholders
of the company whose stock is traded. There can be no presumption, therefore,
that a "hands-off' approach will result in an efficient amount of trading. Under
reasonable assumptions, there will be "too much" trading in stock substitutes.
Part V discusses changes in the law that might follow from our analysis.
We recommend a set of disclosure rules that should clarify existing law, and
provide information to investors and policymakers. We outline substantive
changes that would prevent inefficient trading in stock substitutes. Finally, we
discuss the implications of our analysis on related securities law issues.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF TRADING IN STOCK SUBSTITUTES
A. Information and Stock Correlations
To get a better handle on the potential scope of substitute trades, it is useful
to more specifically define what types of corporate relationships can produce
profitable stock substitute trading opportunities. Vertically, most firms have
upstream suppliers and downstream customers. Horizontally, most firms have
competitors and "complementors. '' 7 All four types of firms can potentially be
stock substitutes. And in each case, different types of inside information could
produce positive or negative correlations between the insider's stock and the
substitute stock. For example, inside information that the demand for PCs is
stronger than expected would create a positive correlation between Intel's price
and the price of one its downstream customers; but inside information that there
would soon be additional entry downstream8 might increase Intel's bargain
power vis-a-vis its downstream customers and thereby create negative
correlation between Intel's price and the price of its downstream customers.
These examples suggest that sometimes buying a customer's stock and
sometimes selling a customer's stock will be a substitute trade for buying a
company's own stock. Examples can readily be provided with regard to each
of the other three types of stock (suppliers, competitors, and complementors) to
show that inside information will sometimes suggest positive or negative
correlations in expected future stock movements. 9
7. The term "complementors" is taken from ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996). A complementor is a company that sells a complementary
product. Complementors for Intel would include to varying degrees both software (e.g.,
Microsoft) and hardware (e.g., Dell) manufacturers. As Brandenburg and Nalebuff stress,
however, increasingly a firm that is a complementor in one context may be a customer,
supplier, or competitor in other contexts. Id. at 28-32.
S. Imagine the new entrant first privately approached Intel to secure chip supply.
9. For example, with regard to a competitor, an insider may have nonpublic
information that industry demand exceeds expectations or nonpublic information that its
Nov. 2001]
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The fact that we as outsiders tend to see technology stocks (for example,
those included in the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index) move together
understates therefore the potential to use substitute trading to circumvent the
insider trading prohibition. From an insider's perspective, the predictable
correlations-at times positive, at times negative-will be much stronger than
what informationally challenged outsiders perceive as an average positive
correlation. We define "trading in stock substitutes" to encompass any trades
in these four types of firms that are substitutes for what, absent insider trading
prohibitions, would be a profitable opportunity to trade in your own stock.
Indeed, substitute trading includes any information-driven transaction
where the informed trader buys or sells a particular security as a second-best
substitute for a prohibited transaction. For example:
An insider who would under Section 16(b) be forced to disgorge short-
swing profits from trading in her own stock might instead trade in a rival's
stock;
Or a lawyer who as a temporary insider under lOb-5 is prohibited from
trading in a client's stock may instead want to trade in the stock of a
complementary product;
Or an outsider who under Rule 14e-3 would be prohibited from purchasing
stock in a company subject to a forthcoming tender offer might instead trade in
a rival's stock.
Whenever a security law prohibits a form of information-driven trading,
the objects of those regulations may have an incentive (unless constrained by
law) to substitute a second-best trade.
There is abundant evidence that profitable opportunities for such second-
best substitute trading exists. For example, Robert Hansen and John Lott have
noted the dramatic opportunities for profitable substitute trading when one firm
decides to enter into another market. In 1974 Kodak decided to enter the
instant camera market (which was until then occupied solely by Polaroid).
Upon Kodak's announcement to enter, Polaroid stock fell from 79 5/8 to 69
1/2, a total drop of $300 million. 10
While there is no direct evidence that Kodak or its employees used this
information to trade in Polaroid stock, there is at least indirect evidence that
someone was trading in this information as the Chicago Board of Options
Exchange restricted trading in Polaroid options four months earlier because of a
buildup of uncovered short positions."I
Similar effects on rivals' prices can be found with regard to the
announcement that new computer chips would be manufactured. Again,
Hansen and Lott note:
product is about to become much better than its competitor's. The former information would
create a positive correlation; the latter information would create a negative correlation.
10. Hansen & Lott, supra note 5, at 261 n.2.
11. See id.
[Vol. 54:235
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On April 23, 1993 Advanced Micro Devices announced that it began
shipping clones of Intel Corporation's 486 microprocessor; Intel stock fell 6-
3/4 to 96 [representing a loss of approximately $32 million] .... On April 14,
1994, IBM and Cyrix Corp. announced a pact whereby IBM would
manufacture Cyrix MI microprocessors, which are also clones of Intel's 486
chip; Intel fell 3-1/4 to 60-1/2 [representing a loss of approximately $16
million] .... On April 26, 1993, Motorola introduced the first versions of its
Power PC chip, which competes with Intel's Pentium chip; Intel fell by 5-1/4
to 87-3/8 [representing a loss of approximately $25 million] .... 12
In our initial example Intel might have used its knowledge of unexpectedly
high chip demand to profitably trade in the stock of its customers or the
manufacturers of complementary products. These examples suggest that a rival
of Intel might have made money by selling Intel short before announcing the
production of a new, competitive chip. But the size of the stock movements on
the date of announcement suggests that corporations are not systematically
exploiting these substitute trading opportunities-leaving billions of dollars of
potential profits lying on the ground.
13
While these Intel examples probably represent unexploited substitute
trading opportunities, there is evidence that industrial mores have not always
constrained businesses from trading in their rivals' stocks. The industrialist Jay
Gould, for example, used substitute trading to profit on the predictable decline
in value of a rival company's stock. When forming new telegraph companies
to compete against the incumbent Western Union, he consistently sold short
Western Union stock.14 And this same maxim-sell thy rival's stock short
before entering-was used against Gould when a new steamship line began
competing against his Pacific Mall company. 15
Dozens of event studies have documented how one firm's announcement
concerning particular types of information consistently change other firms'
stock prices. The majority of these studies concern "intra-industry"
information flows-that is, how information about one firm affects the stock
value of its industry rivals. For example, a 1996 study shows a positive
correlation between one firm's dividends and its rival's stock returns. 16
Unexpected dividend increases (decreases) for one firm led to increased
12. Id. at 262 n.2.
13. We will more directly assess whether and how such trading might be profitable.
See in'fra Part I.B. Our "lying on the ground" reference is to the old joke in which two
economists are walking down the street and one says, "Hey, there's $20 lying on the
ground." The other responds, "There couldn't be; someone would have already picked it
up."
14. JULIUS GRODINSKY, JAY GOULD, His BUSINESS CAREER 1867-1892, at 276 (1957);
MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS; THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861-
1901, at 205 (1934); Hansen & Lott, supra note 5, at 273.
15. H.A., Bye-the-Bye in Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1925, at 3.
16. Michael Firth, Dividend Changes, Abnormal Returns and Intra-Industy Firm
Valuations, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 189, 189, 210 (1996).
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(decreased) stock return for nonreporting rivals. 17 And a parallel result has
been shown with regard to earnings disclosure. Announcements of
unexpectedly increased (decreased) earnings tend to increase (decrease) the
stock return of industrial competitors.18
But theory suggests that many broad types of information might induce
either positive or negative rival stock price reaction. For example, the
announcement of unexpectedly high earnings could be good news for rivals if it
was driven by an unexpectedly high general demand for the industry's goods,
but it could be bad news for rivals if it was driven by the reporting firm's
ability to shift demand away from its rivals or to unexpectedly reduce its costs
relative to its rivals. And indeed one of the more nuanced analyses of stock
market reaction to accounting information shows rivals' stock prices are
sensitive to the underlying cause of increased earnings. If the increased
earnings are caused by an unexpected increase in sales, this tends to be good
news for the announcing firm's competitors; but if the increased earnings are
caused by an unexpected decrease in costs, this tends to be bad news for the
firm's rivals. 19
Similar indeterminacy stories could be told with regard to the impact of
several broad categories of announcements. The declaration of bankruptcy
could be good news for rivals because they have one less competitor, or it
could be bad news because it might indicate that the industry is in poorer health
than was previously thought. The announcement of a horizontal merger could
be good news for rivals because it may increase the chance of oligopolistic
pricing, or it could be bad news for rivals because it may increase the chance of
exclusionary practices. The announcement of a product recall might be good
news for rivals because they may face weaker competition, or it might be bad
news for rivals because it may signal their increased exposure to recalls or tort
liability.
But in at least two of these examples (concerning bankruptcy and product
recall), the best current empiricism suggests a positive correlation between the
stock price of the announcing firm and the stock price of its rivals. When a
firm declares bankruptcy, both its and its rivals' stock prices tend to fall. "A
value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stock experiences a significant loss of
0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement." 2 0
Empirically, the contagion effect outweighs the pro-competitive effect.
17. Id. at 189.
18. George Foster, Intra-Industry Information Transfers Associated with Earnings
Releases, 3 J. AccT. & ECON. 201, 201, 217-19(1981); see also Stephen P. Baginski,
Intraindustry Information Transfers Associated with Management Forecasts of Earnings, 25
J. ACCT. REs. 196, 196, 213 (1987) (discussing the correlation between changes in disclosing
firms' earnings expectations and stock valuation of firms in the same industry).
19. Gun-Ho Joh & Chi-Wen Jevons Lee, Stock Price Response to Accounting
Information in Oligopoly, 65 J. Bus. 451,471 (1992).
20. Stephen P. Ferris, Narayanan Jayaraman & Anil K. Makhija, The Response of
[Vol. 54:235
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Gregg Jarrell and Sam Peltzman have found a similar dominance of the
contagion effect with regard to product recalls. 21 Competitors of drug and auto
firms with recalled products bear substantial losses. For example, the stock
prices of rival drug manufacturers were found to suffer a statistically significant
mean loss of over 1% in the two weeks surrounding a recall.22 A negative
spillover effect was found with regard to automobile recalls as well. On
average, competitors lost about two thirds as much as the recall company lost.
With regard to mergers, the general tendencies are much more contestable
as an empirical matter. There is at least some empiricism, however, of a net
negative correlation between the effects of government challenges to
mergers-the announcement of a challenge tends to reduce the stock price of
the merging company but increase the stock price of its rivals.23
The tendency for rivals' stock price on net to be positively or negatively
correlated upon the announcement of these broad types of information-despite
the theoretical ambiguity-has several implications for our analysis. First,
there may be potential profits for even a relatively uninformed trader to engage
in unnuanced trading if she only knows that a particular rival is about to declare
bankruptcy. Second, as suggested above, there may be even larger potential
profits for more nuanced trading. For while external social scientists may have
difficulty identifying which circumstances are likely to give rise to positive or
negative correlations, that will not be true for industry insiders. An insider
who, for example, learns of an impending tire recall may have a much better
idea of whether the stock prices of rival tire manufacturers are likely to increase
or decrease on disclosure of the announcement than social scientists or
uninformed traders. The existence of a general tendency suggests that profits
from more nuanced trading may be even greater.
There are, however, circumstances where both theory and empiricism point
more strongly toward a negative correlation. For example, one firm's unilateral
increases in its R&D expenditures have been shown to reduce its rivals' stock
Competitors to Announcements of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Examination of Contagion and
Competitive Effects, 3 J. CoRP. FIN. 367, 367 (1997); see also Larry H.P. Lang & Ren6 M.
Stulz, Contagion and Competitive Intra-Industry Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements: An
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. FN. ECON. 45 (1992) (analyzing the degree to which bankruptcy
announcements affect the equity value of the bankrupt firm's competitors).
21. Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of
Sellers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 512, 513 (1985).
22. See id. at 52 1.
23. See B. Epsen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 241, 269 (1983). If credible, this result would suggest that merger challenges on
average do not deter the creation of tighter oligopoly, but instead deter potential future
exclusion (or at a minimum weaken the competitive position of the merging firms). But see
Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers, 11 J. FIN. EcoN.
225, 240 (1983) (finding almost no reaction by rivals); George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W.
Hazlett, DOS Kapital, Has Antitrust Action Against Microsoft Created Value in the
Computer Industry (June 2, 1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (finding
a positive correlation concerning antitrust suit against Microsoft).
Nov. 2001)
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 245 2001-2002
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
prices.24 And while not supported by event study analysis, it is fairly obvious
that in zero-sum contests, such as litigation or patent racing, information about
one firm's prospects would be negatively associated with the prospects of one's
rival. Hence, in the Texaco-Penzoil dispute, information that Penzoil was
about to win (lose) would suggest that it would be quite profitable to sell (buy)
Texaco stock. Or information that Genentech was about win (lose) a
particularly important patent race would suggest that it would be profitable to
sell (buy) its rival's stock.
While event studies to date have focused on the "intra-industry"
information flows 25-that is the impact of one firm's information on its rivals'
stock prices-there is some evidence that suppliers' stock prices are positively
associated with downstream retailers' sales announcements. 26 For example,
Olsen and Dietrich show that when downstream retailers (such as Sears or K-
Mart) experienced a two-standard deviation change in their stock price (plus or
minus) following an announcement of their recent sales figures, suppliers who
sold more than 20% of their products to these retailers experienced parallel
changes which were statistically significant.27 When the retailer's stock price
went down more than two standard deviations, the supplier's stock price on
average dropped 2.7% and when the retailer's stock price increased two
standard deviations, the supplier's stock price increase 2.9%.28 Alnd of course
such vertical information flows could move downstream as well. Our initial
Intel example was in part a story about how a supplier's information about chip
demand could be used to predict changes in the price of a customer (Compaq).
Predictable correlations between upstream and downstream again raise the
possibility of a profitable substitute trading strategy.
B. The Mechanics of Trading in Stock Substitutes
Exactly how profitable could substitute trading be? This section explores
this question by analyzing our earlier Intel example. While only based on one
24. See Changqi Wu & K.C. John Wei, Cooperative R&D and the Value of the Firm,
13 REv. INDus. ORG. 425, 425 (1998); Zaher Z. Zantout & George P. Tsetsekos, The Wealth
Effects ofAnnouncements ofR&D Expenditure Increases, 17 J. FIN. RES. 205, 205 (1994)).
25. See, e.g., Cliff Asness & Michael Smirlock, A Note on REIT Bankruptcy and
Intraindustry Information Transfers: An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. BANKING & FIN. 1171
(1991).
26. See Nancy Beth Bronstein Boim, The Effects of Consolidated Edison's 1974
Dividend Omission Upon the Common Stock Returns of the Utilities Industry, I CHI. MBA
85 (1977); Michael G. Hertzel, The Effects of Stock Repurchases on Rival Firms, 46 J. FIN.
707, 707 (1991) (finding negative, but statistically weak, correlation between repurchase
announcement and price of rival's stock).
27. Chris Olsen & J. Richard Dietrich, Vertical Information Transfers: The Association
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stylized example, our analysis confirms one's intuition that substitute trading
can be extremely profitable. However, because of the relative illiquidity of the
option markets, substitute trading is likely to be more attractive for employees
than for firms themselves.
As discussed above, on November 10, 1998, Intel's reporting of higher
than expected chip demand increased not only its own price but, unsurprisingly,
the prices of many other related firms in the industry. For example, stocks on
the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index increased 5.24%, representing a
combined increase in equity value of almost $4.5 billion.29 This increase in
value represents the theoretical upper limit on the trading profits that might
have been realized through substitute trading if an informed trader could
somehow purchase 100% of the equity in these related firms without inducing a
price increase (and then sell without inducing a price decrease).
Buying 100% of the shares without a market price response is, of course,
impossible to do for both legal and nonlegal reasons. But what is possible? It
is notoriously difficult to predict how quickly and how dramatically the market
price will respond to abnormal increases in the demand or supply for a stock.
To heuristically estimate how much a substitute trader might make in the real
world, we analyzed three (relatively crude) assumptions about the potential
market response. Our first approach-suggested to us by a successful and
well-respected trader-assumes that a substitute trader can (and does) buy 20%
of the average daily trading volume of the stock for the ten days prior to the
29. The price movement in both dollar and percentage terms are reported in Table 1:
Table 1: Philadelphia Semiconductor Index November 10, 1998 Price Movements
TICKER Price on 10-Nov Change on Date Outstanding Theoretical
(percentage) Shares Upper Limit on
Profit
AMAT $ 35.63 5.40% 365,627,000 703,374,941
AMD $26.50 1.90% 143,365,000 72,184,278
KLAC $35.19 4.30% 86,873,000 131,446,146
LLTC $ 63.50 4.50% 76,854,000 219,610,305
LSCC $ 31.00 6.60% 23,558,000 48,199,668
MU $ 44.25 7.60% 212,737,000 715,434,531
NSM $12.94 7.70% 164,841,000 164,218,890
NVLS $41.88 7.00% 33,835,000 99,178,844
RMBS $ 68.13 0.92% 22,703,000 14,229,105
T'-"Nq $ 63.88 8.70% 390,512,000 2,170,123,998
XLNX $49.38 3.00% 72,490,000 107,375,813
Average % 5.24% Total Price $4,445,376,519
Increase Increase
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announcement without triggering a market response. Our second approach-
following a finding of Myron Scholes30-assumes that a substitute trader can
(and does) buy 2% of the outstanding shares without triggering a market
response. And our third approach-following a finding of Laurie Bagwell3 1-
assumes that the elasticity of the stock price with regard to increases in demand
is 2.4% and that the substitute trader buys until the market prices rise to the
informed trader's assessment of its true value.32 These approaches are still
likely to overstate a trader's potential profits because each approach implicitly
assumes that after Intel's announcement, the trader would be able to sell her
holdings of the related firms' stock without inducing a price decrease. Still,
given the severe limits of our knowledge about how market prices react to
informed trading, we still believe this is a useful exercise to give us ballpark
numbers of how much money might be made and how much liquidity a
substitute trader would need to make it.
Table 2 reports the core estimates from our three approaches. 33
30. Myron S. Scholes, The Market For Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure
and the Effects of Information on Share Prices 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972) (finding no selling
pressure on price in study of secondary offerings).
31. Laurie Simon Bagwell, Shareholder Heterogeneity: Evidence and Implications, 81
Am. ECON. REV. 218 (1991) (arguing that earlier study of Dutch Auction stock repurchases
shows inelasticity in the supply curve for purchases of large blocks of securities).
32. For the purposes of this last estimation, we assumed for heuristic simplicity that the
substitute trader can accurately predict what the postannouncement price will be and trades
before hand to the point where the announcement would have no effect on value.
33. The underlying estimates are reported here in Table 3:
Table 3: Underlying Estimates of Potential Market Response
Trader Assumption Scholes Assumption Bagwell Assumption
Cost of Cost of Cost of
Stock Profit Profit Profit
Accumulation Accumulation Accumulation
AMAT $ 520,703,621 $ 28,117,996 S 260,509,238 $ 14,067,499 S 1,688,099,859 $ 91,157,392
AMD $ 148,475,154 $2,821,028 $ 75,983,450 $1,443,686 $ 173,242,266 S 3,291,603
KLAC $ 104,189,308 $ 5,948,950 $ 61,137,742 $2,628,923 S 315,470,751 S 13,565,242
LLTC $ 99,932,090 $8,115,151 $ 97,604,580 $ 4,392,206 $ 527,064,732 S 23,717,913
LSCC $ 74,441,177 $2,398,530 $ 14,605,960 $963,993 S 115,679,203 S7,634,827
MU $ 270,193,520 $ 29,311,639 $ 188,272,245 $ 14,308,691 $ 1,717,042,874 S 130,495,258
NSM $ 141,657,702 $ 3,189,222 $ 42,654,257 $ 3,284,378 $ 394,125,336 S 30,347,651
NVLS $ 39,637,788 $8,980,389 $ 28,336,813 $ 1,983,577 $ 238,029,225 $ 16,662,046
RMBS $ 80,391,123 $1,203,227 $ 30,932,838 $284,582 $ 34,149,853 S 314,179
TXN $ 374,061,976 $ 30,513,162 $ 498,879,080 $ 43,402,480 $ 5,208,297,595 S 453,121,891
XLNX $ 258,487,051 $5,994,269 $ 71,583,875 $2,147,516 $ 257,701,950 $7,731,059
$2,112,170,510 $ 126,593,563 $ 1,370,500,077 $ 88,907,530 $ 10,668,903,645 $ 778,039,061
Two Week Return 6.0% 6.5% 7.3%
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Table 2: Potential Profitability of Substitute Trading on
Philadelphia Semiconductor Index
Percent of Percent of Two-Outstanding Cost of Annualized




Trader 4.69% S2,112,170,510 $126,593,563 2.8% 6.0% 354.2%
Scholes 2.00% S 1,370,500,077 $ 88,907,530 2.0% 6.5% 412.5%
Bagwell 12.57% S 10,668,903,645 S 778,039,061 17.5% 7.3% 523.5%
The results of this exercise teach us that the reaction of the stock market to
substitute trading reduces the otherwise astronomical profits that Intel could
earn from substitute trading. The trader and the Scholes assumptions have the
trader earning 2-3% of the $4.5 billion dollar increase in the value of the related
firms, while the Bagwell assumption does better but still captures less than 20%
of the theoretical upper limit.
We also see that capturing these amounts requires large amounts of short-
term liquidity. The trader and Scholes assumptions require one or two billion
dollars to be invested, while the more optimistic Bagwell scenario would
require Intel to pony up more than $10 billion. At the time of this
announcement, Intel (one of the more liquid companies in America) only had
about $2 billion on hand.34 Given the way capital markets are currently
organized, limited liquidity is likely to constrain a firm's ability to maximally
exploit substitute trading opportunities. Investment bankers will provide bridge
loans for takeover purposes, 35 but lending $10 billion for two weeks to finance
informed trading on a related firm is a service not currently offered by the
investment banking community.
34. In its Balance Sheet for fiscal year 1998, Intel reported having $2.038 billion in
cash. See INTEL CORP., SUMMARY OF 1998 BALANCE SHEET, available at
http://www.pcquote.com/stocks/balance.php?ticker=INTC (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
Intel's revenues in 1998 were $26.273 billion, with $14.129 billion in profits, and a diluted
earning per share of $1.73. See id.
35. Bridge loans are short-term facilities often used to finance acquisitions until longer-
term funding can be secured to replace it. A typical bridge loan will last 180 days and have a
floating rate of 500 basis points above prime, with the possibility of a 180 day extension at
an increased rate. See William D. Riftin, Financing and Funding Mergers andAcquisitions,
in 4 THE LIBRARY OF INvEsTMENT BANKING: MERGERS, AcQuISITIONS, AND LEVERAGED
BuyouTs 80, 85 (Robert Lawrence Kuhn ed., 1990). Typical bridge loans have principal
amounts of several hundred million dollars, see, e.g., Paul M. Sherer, Banks Balk at
Financing Merger Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1998, at A3, but bridge loans may extend
into the billions, see, e.g, Paul M. Sherer, Goldman Sits on Bridge Loan After Maneuver
Goes Awry, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2000, at Cl.
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These liquidity constraints may substantially dampen the interest of firms
like Intel to engage in substitute trading. They earn an astronomical annualized
return on their investment, but because they can only sustain returns for a short
period on what to Intel may seem like a relatively small sum, it may not seem
worthwhile to divert the firm's attention from the big issues (designing the next
chip or marketing the current chip) in order to cash in on profits that are
relatively small potatoes.3 6 Other factors may also militate against trading in
stock substitutes. Earnings reaped through such trading are likely to be
discounted by analysts as nonrecurring gains. And even a small probability of
legal liability or that the investing community might look askance at such a
source of profits might be sufficient to deter this rather modest one-time killing.
On the other hand, the gains in this example are large in absolute and
percentage terms. And the example itself is built on a piece of information that
had a relatively modest percentage effect on stock price. In a volatile and fast-
moving sector such as technology, companies such as Intel will each year find
themselves with information that is apt to have a larger effect on stock price,
and therefore offer larger percentage gains from trading.
Substitute trading may seem even more attractive to employees. The key
difference here is while options markets are not liquid enough to support large
scale substitute trading by a firm, they may be liquid enough to allow an
employee to make what from her perspective may be a sufficient amount of
money without requiring an inordinate amount of capital. To explore this
possibility, we estimated how much an employee of Intel might have been able
to make by trading in the options market. We assume for these purposes that
the employee purchases 2% of the average trading volume for ten successive
days. As shown in Table 4, a two-week investment of approximately $250,000
would have yielded a profit of about $53,500-a 21% return and a 14,277.5%
annualized return. Incorporating transaction costs into the calculation would
reduce the profitability of the trade, but still leave the employee with high
return on investment. Here, as with corporate trading, the return would be
greater if we were considering information that had a greater than 4% effect on
stock price.
36. See Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, Benefits of Narrow Business Strategies 84
AM. ECON. REv. 1330 (1994) (arguing that firms benefit by focusing employee's attention on
improving profitability in core areas of business).
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Table 4: Potential Profits from Substitute Trading on Options (Broker Assumption)
Underlying Strike Strike Price on Price Change Average Cost of DollarTrading
Asset Date Price Nov 10 on Date Accumulation Profit
Volume
Compaq Nov $ 30 S1.97 $ (0.13) 2920 $11,496 $(730)
$ 33 $0.66 $0.13 2254 $2,959 $564
S 35 $0.21 $- 1261 $526 S-
Dell Nov $ 60 $7.69 $0.88 3146 $ 48,362 $5,505
$ 65 $4.28 $1.00 6729 $ 57,614 $13,457
$ 70 $2.86 S0.75 7229 $41,339 $10,843
$ 80 $0.17 $0.44 918 $306 $803
Dec $ 65 $6.72 $1.25 4320 $58,051 $10,800
$ 70 $4.50 $1.00 1573 $14,153 $3,145
IBM Nov $155 $1.41 $1.75 1315 $3,698 $4,603
Microsoft Nov $ 110 $2.02 $0.50 3594 $14,488 $3,594
$115 $0.56 $0.38 1340 $ 1,508 $1,005
Totals $254,501 $ 53,589
Two-week 21.1%
Annualized 14277.5%
The much higher rate of return per dollar invested may make substitute
trading more attractive to employees than employers. 37 It is not surprising,
therefore, that we find that currently, informationally informed substitute
trading is carried out by employees rather than employers.38 Still there is a
slight conundrum as to why firms do not engage in this practice more.
II. IS SUBSTITUTE TRADING CURRENTLY LEGAL?
This section examines the extent to which substitute trading is currently
legal. We conclude that, in many cases at least, such trading is legal.
Companies can trade substitutes without running afoul of Section 10(b).
Companies can give their employees the right to trade in substitute stocks and
can prohibit their employees from such trading. What about employees who
work under labor contracts that are silent as to the permissibility of such
37. Other reasons may also make it more likely that employees rather than employers
trade. As noted above, employers may believe that trading profits will be discounted by
analysts or worry that trades will provoke an SEC reaction. Employees obviously are
unaffected by analysts and may be relatively confident that their trades will go undetected.
On the other hand, employer trading is clearly legal; not so for employee trading. See infra
Part II at pp. 121-22.
38. See infra Part III at p. 132.
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trading? The answer here is unclear and may well depend on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular case.
A. Liability Under Traditional Theories of Section lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provides in relevant
part that
It shall be unlawful for any person... (b) To use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive
device.., in contra-vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe... for the protection of investors.
39
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule I Ob-5 makes it unlawful "(a)
To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud... [or] (c) to engage in
any act.., which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."40
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 may be enforced by a criminal or civil
proceeding initiated by a U.S. Attorney, by a civil or administrative action
initiated by the SEC, or, under some circumstances, by a civil action initiated
by an injured party.
Section 10(b) has been applied to stock trading under two quite different
theories. Under what is sometimes termed the "traditional" interpretation,
Section 10(b) imposes a "disclose or abstain" rule on corporate insiders; such
persons are prohibited from trading on material nonpublic information in the
sale or purchase of securities.4 1 An "insider" for this purpose will include
directors, officers, other employees of the company whose stock is being
traded, and persons who receive tips from such persons. 42 A company is also
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
41. The phrase "trading on" suggests that the information must play a causal role in the
trade, and, as a corollary, that an insider can escape liability by establishing that she did not
use the information in making her trading decision (i.e., that she would have traded anyway).
The SEC has long urged the adoption of a "knowing possession" as opposed to "use"
standard in Rule lOb-5. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-
7881, 34-43154, IC-24599 [hereinafter Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading] (adopting
Rule lOb5-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1, which sets forth a possession standard with exceptions
for sales made pursuant to agreements or written instructions executed prior to coming into
possession of information and for certain sales of market-baskets of securities). Courts have
split on the issue. Compare United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting
possession standard), with United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), and SEC
v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (both adopting use standard). In general, the debate
does not have any special application or relevance to the topic of this Article. We take no
position as to the merits of either party's position, and adopt the "use" terminology only
because it leads to less awkward sentence structure.
42. See WiLLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §§ 5.2.3, 5.3
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considered an insider; it cannot trade on material nonpublic information in its
own stock.43 With one exception discussed below, persons who do not fall into
one of these four groups can profit on material nonpublic information without
violating Rule lOb-5. That rule does not in general impose a "level playing
field" by removing all sources of informational advantages a particular trader
may have. An analyst or another trader who discovers material nonpublic
information may use such information to her advantage. Under the traditional
view, Section 10(b) only eliminates the advantage a fiduciary of a company
may have, and then only to the extent the advantage is attributable to material,
nonpublic information about her company, and is used in security transactions
in her company's stock or options on that stock.
Thus, under the traditional view of 10(b), a director of Intel could not take
advantage of material nonpublic information about Intel to profit from trading
in Intel stock. However, a director of Intel could use the same information to
trade in Compaq stock. The director of Intel is not a fiduciary of Compaq and
so owes no duty of loyalty to Compaq shareholders.
The scope of 10(b) is enlarged somewhat by the so-called "temporary
insider" doctrine. Under that doctrine, outsiders who are entrusted by a
corporation with valuable information under conditions of confidentiality are
treated as insiders of that corporation.44 Thus, an attomey in private practice
becomes a temporary insider of a company that hires him.45 The same holds
true for other advisers, such as accountants, management consultants, or
investment banks.46 The scope of the temporary insider doctrine is somewhat
unclear. It might extend to certain kinds of information gained through vertical
supply relationships. Oracle employees who custom design a database for a
retailer may become temporary insiders of that company; Ford employees who
help design and test a piece of assembly-line manufacturing equipment may be
(1996 & Supp. 2000) (defining "insider" and "tipee" liability).
43. Corporations are clearly subject to the 10(b) liability for misleading statements, and
it is commonly assumed that corporations would face 10(b) liability for trading on material
nonpublic information. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3.02[l][d] (2001); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 42, at §
5.2.3.3.
44. As explained by the Supreme Court,
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to
an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders
may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is
... that [such persons] have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business ... For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the
outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship at
least must imply such a duty.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
45. See SEC v. Lemer, No. 9049, 1980 WL 1388, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 1980)
(determining that attorney cannot purchase stock of client based on confidential information
in his possession).
46. LANGEVOORT, supra note 43, at § 3.02[3]; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 42, at §
5.2.3.
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temporary insiders of the manufacturer. 47 But the temporary insider doctrine
would not apply to most forms of trading in stock substitutes. It would not
apply, for example, to the paradigm case with which we began this Article: the
Intel executive using material nonpublic information about Intel's quarterly
earnings to profitably trade in a competitor's stock. And even when an
employee of one firm is a temporary insider of another finn (and hence
restricted from trading on its stock), substitute trading in yet other companies
may still be profitable. For example, in the Dilbert cartoon displayed at the
beginning of this Article, Dilbert and his fellow employees may be temporary
insiders of the air traffic control corporation (because of the contractual
relationship between Dilbert's firm and the air traffic control company), but
Dilbert would not be a temporary insider of "Bluehound Bus Lines."
B. The Misappropriation Doctrine
1. Generally.
In recent years, the reach of Rule 1 Ob-5 has been expanded considerably by
judicial acceptance of the so-called "misappropriation" doctrine. Under that
doctrine, a fiduciary who breaches the confidence of a principal and profits
from that breach through the sale or purchase of securities has violated
RulelOb-5. The violation occurs whether or not the trader is a fiduciary of the
company whose stock she has traded. The fraud is on the party whose
confidence has been breached, rather than the person on the losing end of the
securities trade. Thus, a lawyer hired by Intel who, through her representation
of Intel, obtains information about Compaq and contravenes her client's
intentions by secretly trading on that information has violated Rule 1 Ob-5. She
has breached a fiduciary duty to her client, deceived her client by not
announcing her intention to trade, and profited from that deception through the
securities markets. 48 In contrast, under traditional doctrine, the lawyer would
47. These situations might also give rise to Section 10(b) liability under a
misappropriation theory. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
48. If the attorney announces her intention to trade, she is apparently not guilty of
violating Rule 1Ob-5---even if the announcement comes after she has gained access to
information and the principal is powerless to prevent her from trading. The reason for this is
that liability requires deception; and according to dicta in the one Supreme Court decision on
point, a fiduciary who announces her intention to trade has not deceived her principal.
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997). If one accepts the premise of the
misappropriation doctrine, this limitation on the doctrine-labeled by some scholars as-
"don't ask, just tell"--seems incorrect. See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, &
Cynthia A. Williams, Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan,
84 VA. L. REv. 153 (1998). It seems more reasonable to find deception in using a position of
trust to gain information. So defined, the deception would not be cured by disclosing an
intention to trade on the information. In practice, fiduciaries who trade are unlikely to
disclose their intentions to their principal, in large part because disclosure may bring other
[Vol. 54:235
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be a temporary insider, or fiduciary of Intel, and would be guilty of violating
Rule 1Ob-5 only if she traded in Intel stock. The misappropriation doctrine is
sometimes described as one of fraud-on-the-source. The victim for whom the
trader is punished is the person whose confidence has been breached.49
Examples of situations in which courts have found 10b-5 violations under the
misappropriation doctrine include a psychiatrist using information gleaned
from a patient to trade Bank of America securities;50 a son using information
gleaned from his father to trade call options in the Amax Corporation;51 a
reporter using information that under contract belonged to his paper to trade on
stocks appearing in future editions of the Heard on the Street column in the
Wall Street Journal;52 and a copyreader using information gained from a
financial printer to trade on four future takeover (or "tender offer") targets. 53
2. Employee trading.
Trading rights defined by contract. Employees are obviously in a fiduciary
relationship with their employers. Most of those convicted of 10(b) violations
under the misappropriation doctrine are convicted for using information
belonging to their employers.54 Employees who work under an employment
contract that forbids such trading and who nonetheless trade do so in clear
sanctions, including termination and civil or even criminal penalties under statutes other than
Rule 10b-5. The discussion herein will assume that fiduciaries do not disclose trading
intentions. This assumption is made to simplify exposition, and because we believe that
disclosure is unlikely to serve as a serious limitation on liability.
49. The person on the losing side of the trade is a victim, too, at least in the economic
sense that she loses on the trade. Without a securities transaction, there is no liability for
misappropriation. But absent the breach of a fiduciary-like arrangement, the trader would
not be punished for using information to her advantage and the other party's disadvantage.
In the example above, the attorney hired by Intel could benefit from Intel information as to
Compaq's prospects-so long as she had permission from Intel.
50. United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
51. Liability under misappropriation requires that the familial relationship leads to
sharing of business confidences, and therefore becomes a fiduciary relationship. See United
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, supra note 41, at 96-97 (applying theory of misappropriation in family settings);
cf United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied 503 U.S.
1004 (1992) (holding that there is no fiduciary duty between a husband and wife for lOb-5
liability purposes).
52. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Carpenter's conviction under the misappropriation doctrine was affirmed by a divided Court.
The Court's decision in O'Hagan makes it clear that on similar facts the Court would uphold
a conviction. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55.
53. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1053
(1985).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993); Carpenter, 791 F.2d
at 1028; Materia, 745 F.2d at 200. Misappropriation arising out of an employment
relationship is discussed in LANGEvOORT, supra note 43, at § 6.04, and WANG & STEINBERG,
supra note 42, at § 5.4.2.1.
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violation of the misappropriation doctrine. It is just as clear that employees
who are given express permission by their employer to use nonpublic
information to trade in stock substitutes are not guilty of misappropriating
information from their employer. Many employees, however, work under
contracts that are silent on this issue. Can such employees trade?
Trading rights not defined by contract. Analytically, it might be useful to
imagine two distinct default rules that might govern employee trading rights.
Under what we refer to as a fiduciary-sourced default, an employee could not
use material nonpublic information obtained through her employment to trade
on stock substitutes unless she had the permission of her employer. Under
what we refer to as a possible harm standard, an employee would be prohibited
(absent permission) from only those trades that posed a real possibility of harm
to her employer. The "possible/probable harm" standard resonates as a
"hypothetical" or "majoritarian" default 55-in that it seems to be the type of
rule that most parties would contract for if expressly called upon to do so-
while the "fiduciary-sourced" standard resonates more as an "information
forcing" or "penalty" default which forces employees to expressly contract ex
ante for the right to trade or ex post to seek permission with regard to particular
trades. 56 Of course, it may be that a majority of parties actually prefer this kind
of information forcing-so that employers can more directly negotiate share(s)
in the benefits of information that flows to agents from the fiduciary
relationship. The case law in this area is ambiguous.
57
The misappropriation doctrine has been successfully invoked by the
government even in cases in which there were no contractual or express
limitations on trading. The government has successfully brought prosecutions
under the doctrine in familial settings, where the limitations on trading are
necessarily implicit. In the employment context, virtually all of the cases over
implicit limitations involve an employee purchasing stock of a "target"
company.5 8 The target company has been either a company the trader's
employer was about to acquire, 59 a company that a client of the trader's
55. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN.
L. REv. 1591 (1999).
56. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertuer, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
57. For a brief summary of the law, together with commentary, see ARNOLD S. JACOBS,
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 1OB-5 at § 66.02[b] (2000) ("While the cases have
not definitively explored this question yet, the policies underlying the Rule suggest that a
person could not exploit his knowledge of these nonpublic facts [and trade in stock
substitutes].") (footnotes omitted).
58. An exception to the "target" employment misappropriation cases is United States
v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing the securities fraud conviction of a state
lottery employee who traded in a company awarded a lottery advertising contract).
59. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 54:235
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 256 2001-2002
SUBSTITUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING
employer was about to acquire,60 or a company in which the trader's employer
was about to make a substantial equity contribution.61
The target cases are of course consistent with a fiduciary-sourced default,
which requires an employer's permission before using employment-related
material nonpublic information for stock substitutes trading. The target cases
are also consistent with a possible harm theory. An employee who purchases a
target stock may be seen by the government or court to be acting against the
interest of her employer. If the employer is the acquirer, the purchase may
drive the stock price up, or tip off others of an impending acquisition. 62 If the
employee works for a law or accounting firm, and the stock is of a target of a
client of that firm, the purchase may tarnish the employer's reputation with the
client, either because it hurts the client directly through increased stock price of
the target, or because it destroys the law or accounting firm's reputation for
confidentiality. Indeed, the target cases can even be explained not in terms of
misappropriation at all, but instead as straightforward applications of the
temporary insider doctrine. A lawyer working for a law firm representing
either the acquiring or target company is in at least indirect privity with the
target company, and hence might be deemed a temporary insider who cannot
trade the target stock.
There have been a number of prosecutions brought for stock substitutes in
stocks of supplier companies, rather than in target stocks.63 In these cases,
however, the employee was violating an explicit employer prohibition on the
use of material nonpublic information.
SEC Rule 1Ob-2 sets forth its interpretation of the misappropriation
doctrine. That Rule does not explicitly address the fiduciary-sourced default
issue in the employment context, although language in that Rule seems
somewhat supportive of the more limiting fiduciary-sourced standard. 64
60. For examples of investments in companies that were about to be acquired by an
employer's clients, see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding
misappropriation of investment bank's confidence); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding misappropriation of law firm's confidence for purposes of a
preliminary injunction hearing).
61. See Ex-Intel Engineer, 2 Others Face Charges of Insider Trading, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 5, 2000, at B5 (reporting that Intel employee and friends purchased call options in
Ancor Communications prior to announcement that Intel was going to collaborate with and
purchase stock in Ancor).
62. In many (if not most) circumstances the purchase will be too small to affect stock
price. It may also be argued that the purchase, if large enough to affect price, might help the
employer by putting more stock into "friendly" hands.
63. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Alireza Hooshiari,
No. 1 99-CV-2043 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 1999) (entering consent decree where BellSouth
employee traded in stocks of companies up for supply contracts); SEC v. William C.
DeGarmo, No. 92-2347 (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 1992) (entering consent decree where counsel for
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory traded in stock of computer company up for
supply contract).
64. The Rule provides that misappropriation occurs "whenever the person
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In practice, in the absence of explicit agreement as to trading rights, a court
or the SEC may well look to evidence of an implicit agreement. Both company
and industry norms are relevant here. Similar trading carried out by other
employees or similar trading carried out by the employee in question that was
known to management and not objected to should largely insulate the trading
from legal challenge. The contemporaneous reaction of the company after
learning about a trade would likewise provide evidence as to the implicit
understanding in that particular employment relationship.
65
We provide some anecdotal information as to trading practices in stock
substitutes and the corporate response to the misappropriation issue below.
66
In general, and as noted therein, there is very little contracting on this issue
either expressly permitting or expressly prohibiting employees from engaging
in substitute trading. Explicit prohibitions are most common in the securities
industry, where there is an awareness of the problem. Even there, however,
most corporate counsel take a facts-and-circumstances approach to the
application of the misappropriation doctrine to trading in stock substitutes:
Employees are often required to report all trades, which can be audited for
reputational or legal concerns.
In Silicon Valley, some firms take a conservative approach and provide
explicit prohibitions on using corporate information to trade on substitute
communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is
communicated have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences, such that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information has a reasonable expectation that the
other person would maintain its confidentiality." The Rule establishes a default assumption
that such expectation of confidentiality exists between immediate family members but
provides that assumption may be overcome by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
trading. The release accompanying the issuance of the then-proposed rule states that
"[c]ertain types of business relationships by themselves provide the duty of trust or
confidence necessary in a misappropriation case. In O'Hagan, for example, the attorney-
client relationship established the duty of confidence. In other cases, the agency relationship
inherent in an employer-employee relationship provides the duty ... ." Proposed Rules
Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-
24209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01 (Dec. 28, 1999).
65. The source and degree of materiality of the information may also be relevant.
Materiality has been defined, generally, as information that may be relevant to the
reasonable investor. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). Under
traditional 10b-5 doctrine, information is either material or it is not; any materiality is
sufficient for conviction (provided other elements of the offense are met). Controversy
centers around whether information is or is not material. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 43, at
§ 5.02; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 42, at § 4.2. The misappropriation doctrine looks to
the nature of the relationship and implicit norms; these norms may well be different
depending on the degree of materiality. Trading on one type of information-or information
which has some but not great relevance for stock price-may be common and within
corporate norms; trading on another type of information with greater impact on stock price
may fall outside those norms. The degree of materiality might also be a factor in the
decision of a government official as to whether to bring a lob-5 action based on a relatively
novel application of the misappropriation doctrine.
66. See infra Part IV.
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stocks. Other firms limit only transactions in and relating to competitor stock.
The reason given for this restriction is that mergers are common in the area,
and companies are worried that innocent employee trading prior to a merger
might get detected by the SEC, with the employee and/or company then having
the burden to in effect prove that the trading was innocent. Most companies,
however, have no express limitations. Most counsel would caution employees
in the possession of material nonpublic information not to trade in substitute
stocks on the fear that the SEC might in fact prosecute the matter. As one
counsel for high technology companies put it, "You'd end up having the case
dropped or winning your case, but would it be worth the profit to go through an
SEC investigation?"
3. Employer trading.
The freedom of corporations themselves to engage in substitute trading is
even more clearly established. While insider trading law restricts corporations
from trading on their own shares on the basis of material nonpublic
information, no current law prevents a company from using this same
information and profitably trading on other companies' stock. Under O'Hagan,
a corporation's use of its own information to trade on other stocks is not
deceptive-you cannot deceive yourself-and hence would not run afoul of the
misappropriation doctrine. A former chief economist of the SEC, Susan
Woodward, was asked if it would be legal for Company A to trade in Company
B shares on the basis of information generated with Company A. She
responded: "All [eight securities lawyers] said that 1) it is legal to trade rivals'
stock; 2) even at its most imperious, the SEC has never suggested that this is
illegal; and 3) they had never heard of such a case being brought, or even
episodes of such trading questioned." 67 Thus, corporations have virtually no
limit on substitute trading.68
67. Hansen & Lott, supra note 5, at 273 n. 16.
68. The only exception to this unrestricted ability of Corporation A to trade on
Corporation B's stock might arise by the operation of some contract between the two
corporations. If an intercorporate contract implicitly or explicitly limits one corporation's
ability to trade on the other, then insider trading liability for substitute trading might arise.
For example, Corporation A might be deemed a temporary insider of Corporation B with
regards to trading on particular types of information. Or alternatively, Corporation A may
have implicitly promised not to trade on Corporation B's stocks when doing so would
impose probable costs on B or its shareholders. Again, the previously noted Carlton and
Fischel example is instructive. The corporation that sells a major customer's stock short
before anticipatorily repudiating a supply contract faces a risk of insider trading liability. In
the case of the aforementioned executive who sold short before causing her corporation to
breach, the question was whether the executive breached an implicit promise to disclose to
her own corporation all trades driven by information about potentially tainted decisions.
With regard to the trades of the corporation itself, the crucial question is instead whether
corporate trading would breach one corporation's implicit promise not to trade in ways that
would impose a probable harm on the corporation or its shareholders.
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C. Other Federal Limitations on Trading in Stock Substitutes
1. Mail and wire fraud.
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are supplemented by federal mail and wire
fraud statutes. The mail and wire fraud statutes apply to "any scheme or
artifice to defraud" that uses the mails or wires, respectively. There is no
statutory guidance as to what constitutes a scheme to defraud in the context of
stock trading. 69 In practice, the interpretations of the mail and wire fraud
statutes seem to follow the interpretation of Section 10(b). Many cases brought
under 10(b) also allege mail and wire fraud; a conviction on lOb-5 is usually
accompanied by a conviction for mail and wire fraud.70 The rough equivalence
between the provisions extends to cases litigated under the misappropriation
doctrine.71 Courts generally decide the merits of the lOb-5 action; the mail and
wire fraud counts are disposed of briefly, in the same fashion and with the same
stated rationale as the 1 Ob-5 counts.72 Mail and wire fraud therefore might
apply to employee trading in stock substitutes under a misappropriation-like
theory. Since the application of the statutes is derivative upon the
misappropriation doctrine, it would be limited in the same way the
misappropriation doctrine is limited. The statutes would therefore not apply to
trading in stock substitutes carried out by a corporation, or to employees
trading with their employer's permission.
2. Rule 14e-3.
Rule 14e-3 imposes a "disclose or abstain" rule on material nonpublic
information concerning a tender offer in cases in which a trader knows or has
69. The mail fraud statute provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud... places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter of thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service... [or] private or commercial interstate carrier, or
takes or receives therefrom... any such matter or thing... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). The wire fraud statute is similar. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
70. Courts have interpreted the seemingly distinct element of mail fraud-the use of
the mails-to be satisfied whenever the trade in question triggers a mailing. This includes
the mailing of stock certificates or broker confirmation slips. The distinctive element in wire
fraud is disposed of in similarly summary fashion. See WANG & STEMNBERG, supra note 42,
at§ 11.31.
71. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
72. Thus, for example, the Second Circuit in Chestman held the defendant not guilty of
misappropriation in a lengthy opinion, and then dismissed the mail and wire fraud counts,
saying only, "The fortunes of Chestman's mail fraud convictions are tied closely to the
securities fraud convictions." Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
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reason to know that the information comes directly or indirectly from the
offeror or target, or employees, directors, or agents of the offeror or target.
Unlike Rule lOb-5, the scope of 14e-3 is not limited to trading by a fiduciary in
violation of confidence of a principal (misappropriation doctrine) or trading by
a fiduciary against a principal (traditional 1Ob-5 liability). Rule 14e-3 applies
in circumstances in which a person in a nonfiduciary capacity to either the
trading party or the information source hears about a tender offer from an
offeror or target. Thus, the rule would prohibit a waiter who overhears a
director of an offeror discussing a pending tender from trading on that
information; it would also prohibit an employer or company from trading in
that same stock-provided again that the trade had its source in material
nonpublic information from a target or offeror, director, employee, or agent of
the same.
But the expansive coverage of 14e-3 does not eliminate the possibility of
substitute trading. Indeed, it may give rise to an impetus to engage in new
forms of substitute trading. For while 14e-3 prohibits trading on the firms
involved in takeovers, it does not prohibit using nonpublic information about
the takeover to profit from trading on other firms in the industry, upstream or
downstream rivals, or the manufacturers of complementary products. Rule
14e-3 provides in part:
If any person has taken a substantial step.., to commence.., a tender
offer... , it shall constitute a... deceptive.., act... within the meaning of
section 14(e) ... for any other person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has
reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has
been acquired directly or indirectly from [the acquirer, target or offeror, or
employees or directors of the issuer or target] to purchase or sell... any of
such securities.
73
The key words, "any of such securities," seem to limit the rule's application to
trading on the stock of the target or the acquiring firm. In particular contexts, it
is easy to guess that the announcement of the MCI/WorldCom merger would
increase the stock price of AT&T (it did); or that the announcement of the
BP/Amoco merger would increase the price of rival oil companies (it did). 74
Economic theory suggests that 14e-3 would cause some of the demand for
informed trading about merging companies to shift instead toward trading on
nonmerging rival firms (or customers or suppliers affected by the merger).0
D. State Law Limitations
Under certain circumstances, employees who trade in stock substitutes may
face state law penalties. Consider, first, civil liability to an employer for
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2001).
74. See Steve Liesman, Bigger Oil; BP to Acquire Amoco in Huge Deal Spurred by
Low Energy Prices, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at Al.
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violating her duty of loyalty to her corporate employer. Under the so-called
"corporate opportunity" doctrine, profits realized by an insider from the
usurpation of a corporate opportunity must be returned to the corporation. In
order for the doctrine to apply, however, it must generally be shown that the
corporation itself would have, or at least might have, availed itself of the
opportunity. 75 The "line of business" limitation to the corporate opportunity
duty means, however, that in most jurisdictions the doctrine would only apply
in situations in which a company has a practice of trading in stock substitutes
and an executive of that company without permission trades in the same
substitutes, robbing the company of the profits it makes off the trades. But
most companies do not have a practice of trading in stock substitutes. 76
Executives of those companies could trade without facing liability under the
corporate opportunity doctrine. The relatively rare cases in which the corporate
opportunity doctrine does apply would largely overlap with cases in which the
misappropriation doctrine applies. 77
There is some limited support for liability to the corporation even in cases
in which the corporation itself is not harmed and the corporation itself would
not have made the trade.78 The leading case in which this form of liability for
traditional insider trading was found, Diamond v. Oreamuno, was cited
approvingly by the Supreme Court in Carpenter in upholding a lob-5
conviction under the misappropriation doctrine:
It is well established, as a general proposition, that a person who acquires
special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary
relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or information
for his own personal benefit but must account to his principal for any profits
derived therefrom.
7 9
The "strict liability" aspect of Diamond has been accepted in some
jurisdictions (including federal courts applying Delaware state law) and
rejected in other jurisdictions. 80 No cases litigated thus far have involved
75. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §§ 7.1-7.2 (1986); JAMES D. Cox,
THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CoIu'oRATIoNs §§ 11.7-11.9 (1997).
76. See infra Part 111, at p. 131.
77. The overlap would not be exact. Rule 1ob-5 misappropriation liability would apply
whenever nonrevealed insider trades violate an explicit or implicit understanding, whether or
not the company ever trades. In that respect, lob-5 liability encompasses a much greater set
of circumstances. On the other hand, the corporate opportunity doctrine is broader in that it
does not require that the information traded upon meet the legal definition of material or
nonpublic, though as a practical matter, trading on information that does not meet those tests
is unlikely to be actionable.
78. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 42, at § 16.3.2.
79. Diamond v. Oreamunu, 23 N.Y.2d 494, 497 (1969), cited in Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Davidge v.
White, 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Delaware law consistent with Diamond). Courts
rejecting Diamond have insisted upon some showing of harm and have differed in their tests
or judgment of what constitutes harm. Compare Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
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trading in stock substitutes. Nonetheless, a state court that accepted the
decision in Diamond and accepted the misappropriation doctrine as set forth in
Carpenter might conceivably find that using nonpublic information to trade in
stock substitutes constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty to the corporation,
even absent a showing that the corporation itself ever traded, or was likely to
trade, in stock substitutes. The Diamond approach to misappropriation is
largely equivalent to the "fiduciary-sourced" default analyzed above. This
expansive definition of what constitutes a corporate opportunity would give the
corporation a property interest in all profitable trading opportunities growing
out of proprietary (fiduciary-sourced) information.
What about liability to shareholders on the losing side of the trade under
common law notions of fraud? In states that follow the so-called "special facts
doctrine," insiders who trade in their company's stock may be liable for
damages to shareholders who are at the losing end of those trades. Few
successful cases have been brought under those doctrines since the adoption
and expansion of lOb-5. 81 More to the point, the doctrines would not apply to
trading in stock substitutes, for the same reason that traditional 10(b) liability
would not apply: The insider has no fiduciary relationship with the shareholder
on the losing end of the trade.
Neither the corporate opportunity doctrine nor the finding of liability under
a theory similar to that set forth in Diamond would apply to employees who
trade in stock substitutes with the permission of their employer, or to trading in
stock substitutes undertaken by a corporation rather than its employees.
Indeed, the whole thrust of the corporate opportunity doctrine is that in the first
instance the corporation should have the option to profit from trading
opportunities growing out of its agency relationships with it employees. It
would be difficult to use such an analysis to support a conclusion that the
corporation was prohibited from trading.
Insider trading is subject to attack under state blue sky laws in addition to
common law standards of fraud and fiduciary duty. The majority of states have
adopted a version of the Uniform Securities Act, which in Section 101 contains
a provision modeled after lOb-5. 82 Some states have eliminated a private cause
1978), with In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987). ORFA suggested that
the harm might simply be that of lost goodwill. See generally LANGEvOORT, supra note 43,
at § 10.0311].
81. Liability under these doctrines is limited, among other factors, by the exclusion of
market (as opposed to face-to-face) trades, and the uncertain application of the doctrines to
sales by insiders to persons who are not shareholders until after the sale. See WANG &
STErNBERG, supra note 42, at § 16.2.3.
82. Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security ... (I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .... or (3) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.
UNIt. SEC.ACT § 101 (amended 1958), 7 U.L.A. 110(2000).
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of action for insider trading violations, and state enforcement is uneven. Not
surprisingly, interpretations under Section 101 (as adopted by the states) tend to
follow interpretations of lOb-5.
83
III. CURRENT CORPORATE PRACTICE
This section looks briefly at two questions: "What do we know about how
corporations regulate employee substitute trading?" and "How much do
employees or the corporations themselves engage in such trading?" The truth
is that we know very little.
On the contracting side, some firms have explicit policies restricting their
executives from trading in other companies' stock. For example, United
Technologies Corp. and Prudential Insurance Co. of America prohibit their
employees from investing "in customers, suppliers or other business
partners."' 84 But such trading restrictions are often driven by conflict of interest
concerns. Employers fear that employees may divert business toward firms in
which they hold stock. This conflict of interest concern seems to be
particularly true with regard to suppliers, and some trading restrictions
accordingly are limited to employees' trading on potential or actual suppliers. 85
The thought here seems to be that employees do not have any ability to favor
consumers-so there is no conflict of interest in holding a customer's stock.86
Firms in the financial industry are perhaps understandably most cognizant
of the problems of informationally based trading in related firms and
aggressively regulate such trading by their employees. Employees of a
brokerage firm are often prohibited from trading on related firms of its
clientele. 87 Such restrictions are particularly easy to enforce as trading firms
often require their employees not just to report but to place all their security
trades through a particular desk.
The question of whether and when employers should allow employees to
trade on related firms' stock is much more actively debated in the technology
83. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 42, at § 16.4.2.
84. Glenn R. Simpson & Scott Thurm, Web of Interests: At Cisco, Executives
Accumulate Stakes in Clients, Suppliers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2000, at Al.
85. For example, Intel and Motorola do not allow senior managers to invest in
companies that conceivably sell to Intel or Motorola. Id. Note that such a rule would not
stop an Intel manager in our ongoing example from exploiting information about increased
chip demand to profit from trading in, say, Compaq stock.
86. However, an employee might favor a customer by negotiating a lower price or by
favoring the customer when the product is in short supply. And holding long positions in
competitors' firms might easily create conflicts of interest for employees but at least in some
firms go unregulated. Some firms (such as Hewlett Packard) go further and bar employees
"from holding financial interests in any supplier, customer, reseller or competitor." Id.
87. Difficult issues arise as to what constitutes a client. For example, we spoke with
brokerage firms that have struggled with whether reading an unsolicited prospectus restricts
an employee's ability to trade on other stocks in the industry.
[Vol. 54:235
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 264 2001-2002
SUBSTITUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING
sector-the so-called new economy. A few companies take a conservative
position and ban all trading on material nonpublic information-including
trading in stock substitutes. Other companies ban trading in competitors' stock.
Some tech companies-flipping the foregoing conflict of interest concern-
actively encourage their employees to hold stock (and even board positions) in
their suppliers so as to influence the supplier's future design choices. 88 Others
allow such trading but require that it be disclosed to and approved by
management. 89 The Manne-like notion that the income from substitute trading
provides a substitute for traditional compensation resonates deeply in Silicon
Valley. Allowing employees to trade on related firms is viewed "as a kind of
disguised compensation which ultimately is in the best interest of
shareholders." 90
In sum, we see some divergence in contracting practice. Some firms
actively prohibit substitute trading-particularly in suppliers and less often in
customers and rivals.91 Some firms allow it (or allow it if disclosed to and
approved by management). But it is our impression that most employment
contracts (outside of the financial and high-tech sectors) are silent as to these
issues.
We know even less about actual substitute trading practices. To begin
with, it is useful to distinguish information-driven trades from incentive-driven
trades. The goal behind some trading on related firms is to profit by hedging
risk or by altering decisionmakers' incentives instead of to profit by cashing in
on nonpublic information. For example, there is some evidence that both
employees and firms trade on related firms to hedge risk of their otherwise
uncovered positions in a particular stock. Employees, for example, who are
forced to hold substantial stock options in their firm may try to hedge some of
their industry-specific risk by selling calls in their rivals' stock.92 A firm
preparing for a takeover contest may similarly attempt to hedge industry risk by
selling short shares in a competitor at the same time it purchases an initial stake
88. Simpson & Thurm, supra note 84 ("Qwest... encourages its executives to serve
on suppliers' boards in the hope of influencing the design of telecom equipment.").
89. For example, at Cisco, employees "may not invest in companies that are Cisco
customers, partners or suppliers with whom the employee acts for Cisco without disclosure
to and written permission from the Cisco vice president for their organization." Id.
90. Id. (quoting John Boatright, head of an academic group called the Society for
Business Ethics).
91. These contractual restrictions stand in contrast to Carleton & Fischel, supra note 5,
at 858 (claiming that before the federal ban firms rarely contracted to prohibit traditional
insider trading).
92. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of
Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440 (2000). Surprisingly few corporate
contracts prohibit such hedging strategies. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, What
Do CEOs Bargain For? An Empirical Study of Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts
(Oct. 31, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting that 62 of 93
sampled contracts with CEOs discussed stock option compensation, eight restricted sale of
options, with three of these restricting pledging and zero restricting hedging transactions).
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of a potential acquiree. There is some evidence of special trading desks that
exist to accomplish these hedging functions.
There is also evidence of cross-holding a rival's stock in order to facilitate
collusion. David Gilo has detailed several instances in which a company has
passively invested in the stock of its competitor:
For example, recently, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth
of nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating-systems
market.... TCI, the nation's largest cable operator became a passive investor
with a 9% stake in Time Warner, the nation's second largest cable operator.
Gillette, the international and U.S. leader in the wet-shaving razor-blade
market, acquired as a passive investment 22.9% of the nonvoting stock and
approximately 13.6% of the debt of Wilkinson Sword, one of its largest
competitors. There are also several cases in which a firm's controlling
shareholder invests in the firm's competitor. A striking example existed, for
several years, in the car-rental industry: National Car Rental's controller, GM,
acquired a 25% stake of Avis, National's competitor. In the very same
industry, it was reported that Hertz's controller, Ford, had acquired $324
million worth of Budget's nonvoting stock.
93
Bizarrely, under the Clayton Act,94 such investments are exempt from
antitrust scrutiny because they are made "solely for investment"--even though
their predictable consequence is less competitive pricing.95  Instead of
permitting such anticompetitive cross-holding, one of us has suggested that
government should at times require procompetitive, merging firms that force
cross-holding to sell their rivals' stock short.96 But neither the hedging nor the
cross-holding transactions are driven by a desire to profit on nonpublic
information.
What little we do know about information-driven trading on related fimns
(as a substitute for insider trading) suggests that some employee trading occurs
but that firms such as Intel do not seem to exploit nonpublic information to
trade on stock substitutes. We can be fairly confident about the absence of
corporate-level trading because corporations' financial statements would
disclose their success in such transactions as an unusual profit item,97 and such
disclosures are nowhere to be found. When we have informally asked
executives why they don't engage in such trading, they variously tell us that it
93. David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment 4-5 (John M. Olin
Discussion Paper No. 189, Harvard Law School, 1996) (footnotes omitted).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1914).
95. Gilo, supra note 93, at 7.
96. See Ian Ayres & Stephen F. Ross, "Pro-competitive Executive Compensation" as a
Condition for Approval of Mergers that Simultaneously Exploit Consumers and Enhance
Efficiency, 19 CANADIAN COMPETITION REC. 18 (1998).
97. Revenues from sources other than primary business activities, if "unusual" and
"infrequent," as defined by APB Opinion 30: Reporting Results of Operations, are reported
as "extraordinary item[s]" on a firm's balance sheet. See ROBERT S. KAY & D. GERALD
SEARFoss, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 13-31(1989).
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would not be consistent with their firm's corporate culture98 or that it's simply
not worth it given the financial and litigation risks involved. Our previous
simulation of the potential profitability from such trading partially supports
these accounts.
Employees who can more effectively exploit options markets, however,
can reap a larger return on less capital. Anecdotes of such employee trading
are known, but the exact extent of the phenomenon is not. The Wall Street
Journal reports that investments by an employee in a customer or supplier "are
common among high-tech businesses" 99-but even here it is hard to know how
much of this is based on nonpublic information. We know that Jay Gould
traded on the private information that his telegraph company was about to enter
a particular geographic market, 100 and there are inklings that insiders at Kodak
traded on Polaroid because they knew about their company's forthcoming entry
into the instant-photo market.101 And a trading strategy that is trumpeted in a
"Dilbert" cartoon strip must certainly have occurred to some employees. But
our ignorance about the size of this "problem" at both the corporate and insider
levels is itself a primary justification for the disclosure rules we propose.102
IV. DESIRABILITY OF TRADING IN STOCK SUBSTITUTES
A. Current Thinking on the Desirability of Insider Trading
Is trading in stock substitutes socially desirable? Consistent with one
branch of scholarship in this area, we focus on the efficiency (as opposed to
fairness) issues raised by such trading. 10 3 We focus first on the desirability of
restrictions on "ordinary" insider trading, that is, trading by an employee in the
stock of her employer, or trading by the employer in its own stock.
Opponents of the present restrictions on insider trading make three related
arguments. 104 First, insider trading by an employee in the stock of her
98. See also Rotemberg and Saloner, supra note 36.
99. Simpson and Thurm, supra note 84.
100. See supra text accompanying note 14.
101. See supra text accompanying note 11.
102. See infra Part V.
103. For a nonefficiency based exploration of the subject, see Alan Strudler & Eric W.
Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REv. 375 (1999).
104. There is a substantial body of literature on this subject. The literature is generally
dated from the publication of Henry G. Manne's article, hi Defense of Insider Trading,
HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113. See also HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Hemy G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors,
23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970) (responding to critics). A summary and extensive
bibliography of the literature can be found in STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONoiics (1999). See also Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, Insider
Trading and Managerial Incentives, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 681 (2001) (suggesting under
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employer is most appropriately viewed as a form of compensation to the
employer-trader. All else equal, trading profits reaped by insiders and lost to
other shareholders could be recouped (on an ex ante basis) through adjustments
to the wage contract. Once insider trading is seen as part of the wage contract,
problems of fairness disappear, at least on an ex ante basis. Shareholders run
the risk of being on the wrong end of a trade with an insider who possesses
material nonpublic information, but pay less in the form of explicit
compensation. Shareholders will also be among the classes that benefit from
any efficiencies produced by insider trading, which are described below.
Second, insider trading would produce more accurate stock prices. Insiders
who possess positive material nonpublic information would purchase stock,
thereby driving the price up to reflect underlying value; insiders would sell on
negative information, thereby driving the price down to underlying value.
More accurate stock pricing would reduce risk to those who purchase stock or
depend on stock value to make lending or employment decisions. 105 This last
category would include employees who accept stock options as a part of their
wage contract. More accurate stock pricing would also lead to better allocation
of resources. Absent insider trading, a firm whose value is in part attributable
to positive material nonpublic information will find it more expensive to access
financial or human capital markets than another equally valuable firm whose
value is fully impounded in stock price. Insider trading equalizes stock price
and so removes that source of distortion.
Third, present insider trading restrictions rely on distinctions that are
difficult to draw, difficult to enforce, and normatively unsatisfying. As noted
in Part I, a trade is not illegal unless information used or possessed is
"material"; defining materiality and applying that definition in a given case is a
difficult task. The rules prohibit trades based on discrete pieces of information;
allowed are equally advantageous trades based on the ability to synthesize and
make use of publicly available information. Yet this ability is often learned on
the job and is itself perhaps a function of less-identifiable nonpublic pieces of
information. Other problematic areas include the determination of damages,
standing to sue, treatment of instruments with debt-like characteristics,
application of the misappropriation doctrine, application of the rules to tippees,
and the question of whether an insider who possesses information and trades
but who does not use the information to guide her trading behavior (i.e., who
would have traded anyway) has violated the rules.1 06 Some commentators
have speculated that these costs alone outweigh any benefits of the
restrictions. 107
limited circumstances that allowing managers to trade may better impound information
about hidden managerial action); Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual
Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 269 (1999).
105. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 866, 867.
106. See WANG AND STEINBERG, supra note 42, § 5.2.3.
107. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 873. An excellent discussion of the
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The efficiency gains from insider trading, however, may be offset (and
perhaps more than offset) by efficiency costs. While insider trading reduces
risk created by inaccurate stock pricing, it increases risk to the insider who
receives trading rights in place of other (presumably more secure) forms of
compensation.108 Insider trading may distort the flow of information to
investors as insiders time the flow of information to maximize trading gains.' 09
Insider trading may also discourage the flow of information within a firm.
Information sharing increases the number of insiders who trade on nonpublic
information; increased trading may affect share price and thus reduce profits to
each insider.1 10 Insider trading may affect resource allocation within a firm, as
managers are encouraged to select those projects that maximize potential
trading gains. 1I1  Risky projects offer more potential trading profits than safe
projects-provided the insider is able to trade before knowledge of the
project's outcome reaches the public. Insider trading may distract executives
from other firm business. Finally, for large companies, insider trading may be
significant enough to distort managerial behavior, but not significant enough to
affect the stock price' 12-a possibility which is described in more detail below.
Debate over insider trading has proceeded in a point/counterpoint fashion:
Arguments on one side produce counterarguments on the other side. For
example, opponents of present law have argued that increased risk taking due
to insider trading will offset overly risk-averse behavior of executives and
therefore will increase, rather than reduce, welfare.113 Opponents of present
law do not argue that insider trading will always be more efficient, only that it
will often be more efficient, and companies ought to be able to elect whether or
not they wish to allow such trading. 11
4
problems with both Rule lOb-5 and insider trading can be found in Jesse M. Fried, Reducing
the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 303 (1998). Fried advocates supplementing Rule lOb-5 restrictions with a regime of
pretrading disclosure.
108. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV 309, 332 (1981); Kenneth E. Scott,
Insider Trading: Rule lob-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801, 808
(1980).
109. See Easterbrook, supra note 108, at 333; Paul E. Fischer, Optimal Contracting
and Insider Trading Restrictions, 47 J. FIN. 673 (1992).
110. See generally Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982).
111. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts,
68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982).
112. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
113. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 876.
114. See MANNE, supra note 104, at 421; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 877.
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B. Hypothetical Auctions and the Quasi-Dominance of Firm vs. Managerial
Trading
We extend the analysis of traditional insider trading by pointing out that
incorporating trading rights into a wage contract ties together unrelated
activities: trading stock and managing a company. The result is apt to be an
inefficient means of obtaining either objective. For this purpose, it will be
useful, first, to consider a simple auction of insider trading rights. The
purchaser would have full access to nonpublic corporate information. The
value of such rights would depend on the size of the company, characteristics
of stock movement, and the ability to translate information into trading profits.
That value is certainly large; for some companies, the value would be
enormous. For a Fortune 500 company, the right to trade on nonpublic
information might be worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per
year. 115
This auction standard is consonant with Carlton and Fischel's statement of
the basic inquiry: "[T]he dispute concerning insider trading is really a dispute
about which party more highly values a property right [in information] . ".. ,,116
They-like us-believe: "Whether insider trading is beneficial depends on
whether the property right in information is more valuable to the firm's
managers or to the firm's investors."1 17 However, unlike these authors who
conclude that a firm's managers are likely to be the highest valuers of the
information, we believe there are reasons why managers would be unlikely to
be the highest bidders in the auction.
A rule that allows managerial insider trading effectively ties such an
auction to the hiring of each high-level executive. One can imagine a company
considering two executives for a single slot, with each executive coming armed
with a bid backed by an investment bank. The value of trading rights
"purchased" might be greater than the value of executive services "sold"; the
company would receive executive services plus a substantial sum of money; the
executive would receive a percentage of trading profits. The process might
produce bids that differ by hundreds of millions of dollars. In some cases, the
company might be better off by hiring a less-favored executive with a high bid
over a more-favored executive with a low bid. Yet the company would be
better off still by decoupling the hiring decision and sale of bidding rights-
115. See supra Part I.B (estimating the potential profits from trading on a single piece
of nonpublic information on stock substitutes). Determining the value of trading rights
would be extremely difficult and would require the expenditure of considerable resources;
one would expect the auction to be won by an investment bank or similar institution.
Investment banks would reduce their bid below expected value to reflect risk; yet managers
and shareholders may see the sale as creating, rather than reducing, risk.
116. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 865.
117. Id. at 863.
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thereby hiring the best executive and selling trading rights to the highest bidder.
Selling bidding rights in return for service is a barter arrangement. In a small
company, perhaps this kind of arrangement would be sensible. Executives
would have some idea of the relationship between nonpublic information and
stock movement, and trading profits would not be great enough to support the
placement of professional stock traders within the company. This would not be
true for a company of any substantial size.
One might reject the auction process and instead imagine a company that
first selects whom it believes to be the best executive and then asks her to bid
on unlimited trading rights. Both the company and the executive would then
have to value the rights. Since there is no reason to believe that the best
executive will give the best price for the trading rights, the company is again
faced with the downside of tying the purchase of services to the sale of trading
rights.
Most companies, of course, would have a number of executives privy to
some forms of nonpublic information. The executives might compete away
some of the trading profits and thus lessen the amount at stake in the sale of
trading rights. On the other hand, the executives may vary in their access to
nonpublic information, thereby requiring a separate auction or analysis for each
executive. And the possibility of explicit or implicit collusion between
executives would make valuation even more difficult.
It might be objected that it is fanciful to think that a company would
auction off positions or allow an executive to engage in unlimited trading on
nonpublic information. Instead, a company might place "sensible" limits on
such trading. The executive might be allowed to place a limited dollar amount
of trades per year or realize a limited amount of trading profits. The limit
would be such that it would be readily attainable by the executive. A corporate
president might be allowed a few million dollars of such trades or a few million
dollars in trading profits. This approach would eliminate the requirement that
the executive partner work with a professional trader. If the limit were low
enough, the value of the rights would be the same to the entire pool of potential
managers. The company could then hire the best manager-whether the
manager were an able or well-funded trader would be irrelevant. The difficulty
with this approach, however, is that such limited trading would not affect stock
price, which is the primary objective of any regime that would permit insider
trading.
What can we learn from our auction metaphor? First, to paraphrase the
"Annie Get Your Gun" lyric, anything an insider can do, the firm can do better.
Prior analysts-like Carlton and Fischel-have tended to compare the benefits
of insider trading by managers to a world in which no one (or only outsiders
eventually) trades on nonpublic information. 1' 8 But most of the arguments
118. Carlton and Fischel, for example, conclude:
Through [managerial] insider trading, a firm can convey information it could not feasibly
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showing that managerial insider trading would be more efficient than an
absolute ban prove too much because these arguments also tend to suggest that
trading by the firm itself would tend to be even more efficient. In other words,
insider trading by the firm itself tends to dominate insider trading by managers.
Insider trading by the firm itself does not give rise to the perverse "moral
hazard" incentive to choose investments that are too risky, or to intentionally
drive down the value of the firm. In addition, most insiders only have the
wherewithal to buy a limited amount of insider trading rights, which means that
there will only be a muted impact on the stock price. Furthermore, by trading
on its own account, the firm is more likely to garner larger monopoly-like rents
on its nonpublic information. In contrast, giving multiple insiders the right to
trade on this information dissipates the value of the trading right. Bidding for
the right to be one of dozens of people who can trade on nonpublic information
is likely to be less valuable than bidding for the sole right to trade on the
information. Insider trading by the firm itself thus will tend to produce even
more accurate stock prices without exposing the firm to the potential costs of
insider trading by managers.
More generally, we see there are a variety of different paths along which
material nonpublic information may impact stock price, including: (1) firm
trading; (2) insider trading; (3) broad-based disclosure to the market; (4)
analyst trading; and (5) trading by suppliers, customers, rivals, and
complementors (and their employees). At times, firms will prefer broad-based
dissemination of information to preempt the ability of insiders or outsiders to
trade on the information. 119 At other times, firms may prefer silence either to
slow the speed of dissemination or with the purpose of increasing analysts'
returns for following the firm.120 Our analysis here merely suggests that firm
trading is likely to dominate insider trading. The dominance result is important
because, even though managerial insider trading may be efficient relative to a
announce publicly because an announcement would destroy the value of the information,
would be too expensive, not believable, or-owing to the uncertainty of the information-
would subject the firm to massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be incorrect.
Id. at 868. But this analysis ignores that the firm could also convey information by trading
on the firm's own account. Such trading by the firm itself would give the firm much more
control over how much information it conveyed to the market and when the information was
conveyed.
119. Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77
VA. L. REv. 945, 995 (1991).
120. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and
"Negative" Property Rights in Information 5-8, 12-14 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the authors). These authors make a strong argument that analyst trading-and at times even
selective analyst disclosure-will be preferred to managerial trading. But as with other
analyses of the problem, their focus is too dichotomous. A default prohibition against
managerial trading may also be valuable in pushing firms toward broad dissemination of
nonpublic information. The lower the turnover of the stock, the more the company will want
to use broad dissemination to prevent analysts or insiders from unnecessarily profiting from
information-driven trading.
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complete prohibition on informed trading, it can still be presumptively
inefficient to the extent the firm can accomplish the same benefits without
creating as great a risk of perverse managerial incentives. 12 1
We readily acknowledge that this dominance tendency will not always hold
true. Allocating an insider trading right to managers might nevertheless be
efficient if, for example, managers brought independent knowledge to the jobs
that made them more efficient evaluators of the firm's nonpublic information
than the corporation itself Michael Dell, for example, might have independent
knowledge of the computer industry that would make him a more efficient
trader on the information generated by Dell Computers than could be generated
if he merely advised the Dell board on what trades he believed were
profitable. 12 2 Additionally, it may be efficient to hire managers who have
commitments to multiple firms so that their trading will be informed by
overarching data about a given sector. Carlton and Fischel have also argued
that giving managers trading rights gives managers better incentives to identify
valuable new investment opportunities: "If a manager observes a possible
valuable investment for the firm-such as a potential value-increasing merger
or a possible new technology-he will be more inclined to pursue this
opportunity if he is rewarded upon success. Insider trading is one such
reward."
12 3
But we are skeptical of this argument. Giving the manager simple stock
options or a bonus contingent on the firm's stock price seems to us a more
tailored approach to giving employees appropriate incentives. 124 Repealing the
insider-trading prohibition and replacing it with a laissez-faire default would
(absent an agreement to the contrary) give employees unlimited insider trading
rights that might shower employees with profits incommensurate with those
necessary to harness their efforts. 125 So while we readily admit that firm
121. A similar argument can be made with regard to the defensive tactics of greenmail
and lockup agreements. While Jon Macey and Fred McChesney showed that it might be
efficient for a firm to pay a potential acquirer greenmail in order to induce other bidders to
bid, there is still a strong argument that greenmail is inefficient because its auction-creating
benefits can be maintained with lockup or standstill agreements that do not raise the risks of
managerial entrenchment. See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury
Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 682, 710-12 (1990).
122. See, e.g., Julie Johnsson, Dell, Insider Cut Back on Their Lante Stakes, CRAIN's
Cm. Bus., Sept. 25, 2000, at 6; Talking Stocks (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 6, 2000).
123. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 871.
124. But see Thomas H. Noe, Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency,
13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1997).
125. It is a frequent mistake of legal scholars to confuse arguments concerning the
mandatory nature of law with arguments about what the optimal default should be. The
opponents of insider trading prohibitions-including Manne, Carlton and Fischel-basically
argue against the mandatory nature of the prohibition. But even if these arguments are
accepted, one would need a separate set of arguments to determine whether default
prohibition is more or less efficient than the default laissez-faire regime for which they
argue. See Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26
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trading will not dominate managerial trading in all contexts, we doubt that
firms contracting to cede trading rights to their managers would often cede
unlimited rights. Rather, we imagine that firms would more likely contract to
(1) share in any managerial profits; (2) restrict the ability of managers to
engage in informationally-driven short sales; and, most importantly, (3) require
managers to disclose their trading to the firm after the fact. Ex post disclosure
would help the firm assure that the prospect of trading profits had not distorted
managers' decisionmaking and more accurately price the true value of such
trading rights.
A substantive theory of when and what trading rights would be ceded is
important because such agreements would constitute classic examples of self-
dealing that should be subjected to both the substantive and procedural
requirements of the duty of loyalty.126 Contracts permitting insider trading at a
minimum should be approved by a majority of disinterested directors and
should probably be subjected to substantive fairness review. The specter of
managerial self-dealing undermines our confidence that the corporation's
decision to allow managerial trading truly internalizes all the costs and benefits.
Just as in the takeover context, where the fear of managerial self-interest might
drive the decision to fend off a tender offer, heightened scrutiny is
appropriate. 127 Indeed, the presumptive dominance of firm trading, when
combined with agency cost concerns, might even counsel for a per se
(mandatory) prohibition against such trading. 128 But we would not go so far.
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 897 (1999) (arguing that Dworkin and Epstein make similarly
incomplete arguments regarding, respectively, libel and Title VII liability).
126. See, e.g., Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
directors engaging in self-interested transactions must bear the burden of demonstrating that
the transaction was "fair... and reasonable to the corporation" and that they "may not
escape review of the merits of the transaction"); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (Sup.
Ct. 1944) (holding that "transactions as may tend to produce a conflict between self-interest
and fiduciary obligation, are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care" and
that courts would require not only "good faith," but also "inherent fairness").
127. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D. Nev.
1997) (holding that "[a] board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching
upon issues of control that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect"
and cannot be upheld without "compelling justification" (citations omitted)); Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (holding that a court must apply enhanced
scrutiny to directors in the takeover context before the directors can receive the protections
of the business judgment rule); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (holding that "a court subjects directors' conduct to enhanced
scrutiny to ensure that it is reasonable" when the corporation is about to break up or when
there is a potential change or sale of corporate control); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1985) (holding that the business judgment
rule does not initially apply in the takeover context); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (holding that defensive measures taken by a board must be
reasonable in relation to the perceived threat to the corporation).
128. The analogy here might be to the traditional mandatory rule against managers'
taking loans from corporations. Some jurisdictions have statutes in force establishing
liability for proscribed corporate loans to directors and officers. See, e.g., Resolution Trust
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We would join the critics of present law in concluding that the mandatory
prohibition against managerial insider trading is wrong. Limited trading rights
for executives might on relatively rare occasions be sensible. A default
prohibition with strict procedural and substantive fairness scrutiny of express
attempts to opt out should be sufficient to ensure that managerial self-dealing
does not lead to uncompensated transfers of the firm's trading rights. Our
analysis suggests, however, that the costs of the present mandatory prohibition
on employee trading are-judged on a system-wide basis-rather small.
On the other hand, our quasi-dominance results suggest that the current
mandatory rule againstfirm trading may give rise to larger inefficiencies. The
inefficiencies of the tying arrangement and the incentive problems can be
avoided by having the company, rather than its employees, trade directly in its
own stock. Indeed, as long as the company sells its trading rights in an arm's
length transaction-for example, to investment banks or other professional
trading concerns-we would only subject the arrangement to the much less
searching business judgment rule. Both the costs and benefits of the firm
trading itself (or selling the rights to a third party) are internalized to the
corporation, and the corporation ought to be allowed to opt out of a default
prohibition. We again would favor a default prohibition against insider trading
by the firm (or its non-managerial delegate), but we would allow a firm to opt
out in its articles of incorporation. 
129
C. Desirability of Trading in Stock Substitutes
How does our analysis change if the focus is on trading in another
company's stock? In general, trading in stock substitutes by employees is
likely to produce the same sort of costs and benefits as described above.
However, many of these costs and benefits are externalized to the shareholders
of the firm traded. On the benefit side, informed trading is likely to move stock
prices toward their fundamental levels and to reduce the salary income of
managers. On the cost side, informed trading is likely to increase the bid-ask
spread of the traded firm and might induce managers to make wasteful and
Corp. v. Greer, 911 P.2d 257, 261 (Okla. 1995). While there are good reasons why
managers might loan money to their firms, it is more difficult to justify corporate loans to the
management. In the rare case, a corporation's loans to its own management might be an
efficient investment, but the history of such lending has been so rife with unjustified self-
dealing that the mandatory prohibition might be easily justified on rule utilitarian grounds.
129. A default prohibition might be justified as a majoritarian rule. For while we have
argued that firm trading dominates managerial trading, we are agnostic as to whether firms
would prefer broad dissemination or analyst trading as superior means to price nonpublic
information. However, even if a majority of firms would ultimately opt for the ability to
trade on their own stock, a default prohibition (especially in the transition) would provide
potential shareholders with valuable information about whether they run the risk of facing a
trading partner with systematically superior information when they buy or sell the
company's stocks. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 55.
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inefficient decisions (which further their trading prospects). These social costs
cannot be avoided through a rule that allows each firm to choose whether or not
it wishes to be covered by the current insider trading rules. Nor can these costs
be avoided by having the firm, rather than its employees, do the insider trading.
1. The externalization of costs (and benefits).
It might be useful to begin by focusing on the effect of trading in stock
substitutes on managerial investment or resource allocation decisions. Quite
clearly, there are some facets of enterprise operation that do not affect or
provide information about other companies. 130 However, many-and perhaps
most-significant corporate initiatives will affect other firms. A risky
investment in a new chip architecture, for example, may reduce the value of a
competitor if successful and raise the value of the competitor if unsuccessful.
This form of investment raises the full panoply of inefficient incentives
described above. The expected value of trading profits may distort the decision
to invest; the manager may withhold information from the public and other
managers within the firm so as to profit from trading on the results; the trading
will distract the executives from other firm issues; and so on. The same
analysis applies to trading on information from past resource allocations.
Information as to market share, profits, orders, future prices of raw materials,
and the like offers opportunity to trade in stock substitutes, leaving the
executive with incentives to control the flow of information and distracting the
executive from other firm business.
The potential gains from trading in stock substitutes should produce the
same effect on wage levels as gains from direct insider trading: Compensation
ought to be (and presumably is) reduced by the expected value of the gains to
the employees. The substitute trading would tend to move the stock price of
the traded firm (and possibly the stock price of the non-traded firm) toward its
fundamental value-but would also predictably increase the market maker's
bid-ask spread. 131 If employees are not the optimal traders, building this form
of compensation into the employment contract will be inefficient. 132 Again,
130. The settlement of a class action based on discrimination within a firm would fall
into this category-provided, of course, the settlement did not affect or provide information
about similar actions at other firms. The same could be said for adoption of a new trading
strategy with temporary cash reserves. A firm may have some monopoly power over some
portion of its market. Resource allocation decisions that affect profits within this imperfectly
competitive space might similarly have no effect on-and provide no information about-
the stock price of other companies.
131. The substitute trading might also impose costs on the firm whose stock was traded
if it reduced the profitability for market analysts' following the firm. Reducing the trading
profits of analysts could redound to the firm's detriment by reducing the liquidity and
information services provided by analysts. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 120.
132. We refer here to the costs of information-based trading. Executives may hold and
trade other firms' stocks for other reasons, and these holdings may be positive or negative
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our quasi-dominance and self-dealing discussion is apposite. Substitute trading
by the firm is likely to be more efficient than trading by its employees. There
still is the possibility that employees will have independent knowledge or risk
preferences that make them value the trading property more highly, but this
consideration must be balanced against the risk that the managers will induce
their corporation to permit substitute trading that is ultimately not in the
corporation's self-interest.
All this is to say that substitute trading on the basis of nonpublic material
information gives rise to the same basic categories of costs and benefits as
traditional insider trading by managers on their own stock. However, with
substitute trading, the costs and benefits accrue to different finns. The most
salient difference between trading in stock substitutes and direct insider trading
is that losses are not borne by the employer's shareholders; they are borne by
the shareholders of the company whose stock is traded. A second important
difference between the two types of trading is that, with substitute trading, the
benefit of more accurate share pricing is realized directly not by the employee's
company, but by the company whose stock is being traded.133
The externalization of costs and benefits makes it unlikely that a firm
acting in its self-interest and without coordination with other firms would
achieve an efficient rule with respect to employee insider trading. The firm's
response would depend on the relationship between costs and benefits, which
for their employer. See supra Part III (discussing current corporate practice). For example,
firms that compensate their executives with traditional stock (or stock option) incentives may
want to regulate the executive's ability to hold substitute stocks. While the insider trading
concern turns on the effects of the actual buying and selling, the incentive analysis turns on
the effects of holding certain substitute securities. Firms with traditional stock incentive
plans may need to prohibit executives from hedging away too many of their incentives. Ford
executives might hedge the risk that they will lose market share to General Motors by buying
General Motors stock; they might hedge their industry-specific risk by shorting stock of
automotive suppliers. We have some anecdotal evidence that some brokerage houses have
private trading desks to accomplish just such a function for executives. But economic theory
suggests that firms at times will want to require a certain amount of stock substitute hedging.
The standard principle-agent model suggests that firms will want to tie executive
compensation to managerial effort as much as possible given managers' relative risk
aversion. But the problem with many traditional stock incentives is that managers'
compensation can be affected by exogenous shocks which drive the entire industry's stock
prices up or down. If general movements in the industry's stock prices are exogenous to
managerial effort, then the firm will want to create incentive structures that hedge away
industry risk. Such a compensation plan might combine call options in an executive's own
firm with put options on the rival firms. Hedging away industry risk loosens the risk
aversion constraint and thereby allows firms to go further in tying a manager's compensation
to her effort. For these purposes, this analysis suggests that firms will at times both require
a certain amount of managerial holdings of stock substitutes to hedge away exogenous risk
and simultaneously restrict managers from hedging away the residual incentives that the firm
wants to maintain. As an empirical matter, few firms tend to make either of these
requirements contractually explicit.
133. There is a possibility that the substitute trading will indirectly affect the stock
price of the employee's own firm if, for example, the market infers a general sector shift.
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would vary from firm to firm and time to time. In general, however, it seems
likely that the employees' gains from trading, unbalanced by the external losses
suffered by shareholders of another company, would more than offset the
internalized costs of such trading. If that is the case, a firm would rationally
permit or even encourage trading in stock substitutes-even when such trading
is socially inefficient.
134
To see how the externalization of costs and benefits can lead toward
inefficient employer decisions, we provide here a highly stylized example.
Assume that Intel employees could expect to earn 100x profit from trading in
the stock of competitor Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"). Since the trading
is risky, the 100x expected profits are valued by Intel employees at 90x.
Trading distracts Intel employees, distorts the flow of information within Intel,
and on occasion distorts investment decisions by Intel mangers. Intel values
those costs at 5x. Trading produces a more accurate stock price of AMD; this
is valued by AMD at 2x and generates an additional value of lx to those who
base decisions on AMD stock price. Substitute trading produces social benefits
of 93x and social costs of 105x. 135 If the true benefits and costs were
internalized to Intel, it would not be allowed. In fact, Intel may reap benefits of
90x, through reduced compensation by the perceived value of the trading
profits. Intel incurs costs of only 5x, for a net gain of 85x. The difference
between Intel's gain and social loss is realized largely by AMD and its
shareholders who, in this example, suffer a net loss of 98x. The loss to AMD
might translate into an even larger gain to Intel if and to the extent that the loss
raises AMD's cost of capital, making it harder to raise financial capital and
harder to attract human capital through stock-based compensation. Permitting
your employees to trade on your competitors' stock may be a socially
inefficient, but privately profitable, strategy of raising rivals' costs. 136 This
does not mean that trading in stock substitutes on balance benefits Intel and its
shareholders-because the game could easily devolve into a race toward the
bottom. At the same time Intel executives are trading in AMD stock, AMD
executives are presumably trading in Intel stock. If the numbers are
symmetrical, then Intel and its shareholders suffer a loss of 98x at the hands of
AND executives. Intel's overall loss is roughly the social costs of the practice.
Can Intel eliminate this loss by prohibiting its executives from trading in AMD
stock? No, because the trading that causes the loss is done by AMD, rather
134. This is most likely to be true when a firm's executive trades in a rival's stock. In
cases of upstream and downstream privity, we might expect private contracting between the
parties to limit this form of trading. See discussion infra notes 104-118 and accompanying
text. The case of complementary products-Intel processor and Microsoft software-
actually falls between the two extremes. Losses suffered by one firm at the hands of
executives at another firm that sells a complementary product may hurt the latter firm.
135. Social benefit: 90x (trader value) + 2x + lx (more accurate AMD price) = 93x.
Social cost: 100x (trading losses) + 5x (decision distortion) = 105x.
136. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
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than Intel, executives. Intel and AMD are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma
game of reciprocally imposing negative externalities on each other.
The social costs in the above example are clearly artifacts of numbers we
chose in illustrating the dynamics of substitute trading. Costs and benefits are
both externalized; the magnitude of each term is an empirical matter about
which we do not opine. As an analytic matter, it is possible that the benefits
outweigh the costs. 137 We doubt that this is the case, however, and most of the
examples we use throughout will reflect our belief that the distortions caused
by trading outweigh the incremental benefit of a more accurate stock price of
the traded company.
138
2. Trading by firms rather than employees.
Earlier we noted that (1) insider trading by the firm was likely to be more
efficient than insider trading by employees; (2) trading by the firm eliminated
most of the decisional inefficiency associated with such trading; and (3) firms
could be expected to establish a policy of trading only in those situations under
which such trading was efficient.
The first of these results holds when we examine trading in stock
substitutes: The firm is likely to be a more efficient trader-any trading the
employee can do, the firm itself can likely do better. Trading by the firm, for
example, eliminates the inefficiencies entailed in tying the purchase of
managerial services to the exercise of trading rights. The second and third
results, however, do not hold up when we examine trading in stock substitutes.
There is no reason to expect that firms would trade only in those conditions
when trading was socially desirable. Again, this is due to the fact that the
trading loss to shareholders and the gains from more accurate stock pricing are
both externalized. Assume, for example that Intel is considering a high-
variance business strategy that will affect the price of a stock substitute and that
the strategy imposes certain costs. These costs must be weighed against the
profits realized from trading in a rival's stock and the possibility that trading
will raise the rival's cost of financing. Intel's calculation ignores the losses to
the rival's shareholders and the gains from more accurate stock pricing. Intel
will pursue the strategy so long as the gains from trading and indirect gains
from raising its rival's cost of capital exceed the costs of the strategy to Intel.
137. The intuition behind such a counterintuitive (and we believe unlikely) result
would be that the prohibition on insider trading and possibly the recently enacted "fair
disclosure" Regulation FD create large inefficiencies in pricing that are solved or at least
mitigated through substitute trading. Our present belief that the market is "acceptably"
efficient in pricing might change if a primary mechanism by which the market adjusts is
eliminated.
138. But cf supra at p. 268 (examples in which trading may either be efficient or
indeterminant).
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It is possible that the welfare losses are increased if the firm, rather than the
employees, trades in stock substitutes. This will be true if firm trading in stock
substitutes is in itself inefficient, employee trading is more inefficient (as we
assume), and the internalized losses to the firm of employee trading exceed
firm gains. The inefficiency of employee trading puts a brake on a practice that
is also inefficient but would otherwise be in the firm's self-interest. We noted
earlier that, given a fixed amount of trading in stock substitutes, it is more
efficient to have the firm, rather than employees, trade. But moving from
employee to firm trading reduces internalized costs to the firm and makes it
more likely that a socially inefficient practice will be adopted as in the firm's
best interest. 139 By "firm's self-interest," we mean the self-interest of the firm
and shareholders under conditions in which coordination with other firms is
impossible.
The indeterminate efficiency effects of such trading at the firm level was
pointed out long ago by Jack Hirshleifer. 140 Hirshleifer thought about the
efficiency consequences of having inventors trade on their rival's stock. He
concluded that such trading could lead to either too much or too little incentive
to innovate. The additional profits from such trading might usefully increase
the incentives to innovate, but there is also the possibility that it would create
too much of an innovation incentive-by giving innovators a reward (profiting
on their rival's loss) that was greater than the invention's contribution to social
value. A parallel story can be told here. It is possible that allowing Intel to
profit from trading on other high-tech firms would improve its incentive to do
market research about future chip demand. Without such trading, Intel has an
insufficient incentive to spend money to accurately forecast chip demand
because it does not capture all the external benefits from producing such
information. However, these trading profits may induce Intel to produce too
much information from an efficiency standpoint.
If we assume that (due to patents and other factors) innovation is
adequately rewarded absent substitute trading, substitute trading will
systemically provide too much reward for innovation-at least that form of
innovation that produces private information. Recall our earlier example of an
139. A numerical example may be useful here. Assume Intel is considering a risky
project with an expected value, apart from trading profits, of -10x. Trading profits on the
project have an expected value of 15x to Intel or its employees, and -15x to AMD
shareholders. Giving Intel employees insider trading rights imposes a cost of 6x on Intel.
Trading by Intel employees (with profits recouped through adjustments in the wage contract)
produces social costs of 16x and provides Intel with a net return of-lx. Intel chooses not to
undertake the combination of project/trading. If the trading in AMD stock is done directly
by Intel, social costs and costs incurred by Intel each decline by 6x. The project now
imposes social costs of lOx and provides Intel with a net return of 5x. The project and
trading are now attractive to Intel.
140. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reivard to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
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investment in a risky chip architecture. The expectation of trading gains may
turn a socially undesirable project into a privately lucrative project.
It would be wrong, of course, to single out the effects of substitute trading
on investments in innovation. All investments or behavior that produces
private information is favored. If substitute trading were unavailable, a
company may find it most profitable to match a competitor's price. But a
company may decide it is more profitable to purchase its competitor's stock
and then announce that it will not match its competitor's price. In this example,
substitute trading gains have an anticompetitive effect and, in the short run at
least, reduce consumer welfare. In other cases, substitute trading may have an
opposite effect. A company that would otherwise decide not to match a
competitor's price might decide otherwise and recoup its lost profits through
gains from shorting its competitor's stock. In still other cases, a company will
find itself in the fortunate position of taking the otherwise profit-maximizing
path and still trading on the result before it is announced. The common feature
of these examples is that the possibility of gains from substitute stock trading
has the potential to distort business decisionmaking.1
4 1
Indeed, seeing the externalizing effects of substitute trading calls into
question the presumptive efficiency of "outsider" trading on nonpublic
information more generally. In deciding whether to expend resources on
information-gathering and then trade on nonpublic information about a
company, an outside analyst-like the substitute trader-does not internalize
all the costs and the benefits of such trading. A la Hirshleifer, the generic
outside trader may have too much or too little incentives to trade. Manne's
original internalization insight taken to its logical conclusion flips all our
intuitions: Not only is insider trading (by the firm, we argue) presumptively
efficient because of internalization, but all outsider trading (including substitute
trading) is, if anything, presumptively inefficient.
So even if we have distinguished substitute trading from insider trading as
being worthy of regulation, we still need to distinguish substitute trading from
this more general category of outsider trading as being more worthy of
regulation (or we would be driven to the regulation of outsider trading more
generally). We think substitute trading is more problematic than outsider
trading for two reasons.
141. To give an even more extreme and chilling example: Substitute trading may make
it profitable for a firm intentionally to reduce its underlying profitability. As a theoretical
matter, it is illuminating to consider an "Atlas Shrugged" scenario in which a firm (say,
Microsoft) destroyed all of its productive capacity on a particular day but profited
immensely by selling another firm's stock short. It has long been understood that traditional
insider trading might give unfaithful fiduciaries an incentive to reduce the underlying
profitability of their own firm (to profit from short selling), but substitute trading raises the
possibility that faithful managers would intentionally reduce the profitability of their firm in
order to further their shareholders' ultimate interest.
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First, the substitute trader can more easily than the outside trader take non-
trading actions that affect the profitability of the traded firm. These costs are
apt to be much larger than the costs an analyst incurs to acquire information.
Second, the traded firm may have less ability to protect itself from
inefficient substitute trading. Firms can preempt outsider trading by releasing
nonpublic information on which analysts trade to the market as this information
comes into existence. There is an increasing trend for firms to voluntarily do
this by, for example, releasing weekly sales data to the market.142 When traded
firms can preempt outsider trading by public disclosure, then the firm's failure
to do so can be seen as implicitly giving the outsider permission to trade on the
nonpublic information. Even though the outsider does not internalize the costs
and benefits of such trading, the traded firm's prior decision of whether to
release the nonpublic information goes a long way toward recreating an
internalization-type argument with regard to outsider (analyst) trading.
The decision of the firm not to preempt the outsider and the decision of the
outsider to trade jointly tend to internalize the costs and benefits of such
trading. Substitute trading, however, stands on a different footing than outsider
trading because the traded firm often itself is not privy to nonpublic
information-and it does not have the option of preempting the substitute
trading by prior disclosure. Compaq might not know that Intel has experienced
greater than expected chip demand. Texaco may not know that Penzoil has
discovered a document that will win (or lose) the case. Genentech may not
know that Chiron has cloned Human Growth Hormones. Substitute trading is
accordingly more worthy of regulation than outsider trading by analysts
because substitute traders have a greater ability to take non-trading actions to
hurt the traded firm, and the traded firm has less ability to protect itself from
the externalized harms of such trading.
142. In October 2000, the SEC promulgated a new rule-Regulation FD-that requires
corporations to divulge material information about their performance to everyone at the same
time, thereby depriving analysts of the informational advantage they previously enjoyed.
See Jonathan Fuerbringer, When Companies Talk, Who Gets to Listen?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2000, at Cl. However, even before this rule came into effect, companies were already
moving in the direction of broader disclosure. Companies, including big corporations such
as Intel, for example, were already disclosing corporate performance information to the
general public. See Kenneth Aaron, Companies, Investors Play by New Rule, TMES UNION
(Albany, NY), Sept. 26, 2000, at El; Fuerbringer, supra; SEC Fair Disclosure Proposals
Meet with a Mixed Reaction, INVESTOR REL. Bus., Jan. 10, 2000, at 1. A news report stated
that "broadcasting of Wall Street analysts' meeting on the Internet, what is known as
Webcasting, is already becoming standard procedure and will grow, as will public access to
conference calls that companies use to brief analysts." Fuerbringer, supra. The National
Investor Relations Institute estimated that "86% of its member companies that hold earning
conference calls allowed individual investors to listen in, up from 29% two years ago.
About 74% let the news media listen in, up from 14%." Id.
Admittedly, outsider trading by public disclosure is not a panacea. At times, the firm
will have a legitimate business reason for not disclosing-such as in SEC v. Taras Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), where the firm wanted to be able to buy land
on the cheap.
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3. Trading on privity substitutes (i.e., customers, suppliers, orjoint
venturers).
In the next two sections, we will distinguish between a firm trading in
"privity" and "non-privity" substitutes. By a privity substitute, we mean firms
that have a contractual relationship with the trading firm-including the trading
firm's customers, suppliers and co-venturers. By a non-privity substitute, we
mean firms that do not have a contractual relationship with the trading firm (but
nonetheless may have correlated fates)-including the trading firm's rivals and
complementors. The privity/non-privity distinction is important because it is
more likely that firms in privity with one another will be able to contract
expressly or implicitly to internalize the otherwise externalized costs and
benefits of substitute trading-by the firms or their executives.
Analytically, the question of whether a particular firm would contract to
allow another firm to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information is
analogous to the question of whether a firm would contract to sell trading rights
to its own managers or to a third-party investment firm.143 Because the social
costs and the social benefits are dominantly visited upon the trading and the
traded firms, an arm's length contractual indication that the two firms find such
trading to be beneficial is strong evidence that the agreement should be
respected. Indeed, the case for respecting such contracts is in two related
respects greater than the case for respecting a firm's decision to allow its
employees to engage in traditional insider trading. First, granting a supplier or
a customer the right to profit from trading on nonpublic information does not
raise self-dealing concerns that would tend to undermine our confidence that
the ceding firm actually benefits from the trading. Second, while a firm may be
a more efficient trader than its employees (as we argue earlier), it may not be a
more efficient trader than another firm. One firm may have special insight into
the prospects of related companies-not only because the prospects of the
related companies may be tied to the prospects of the trading firm, but because
the trading firm may have proprietary data as to how the traded firm's products
stack up against it's competition. For example, Compaq may have better
knowledge than Intel as to how an Intel processor fares against a rival
processor.
What would a privity contract that allowed such trading look like? A
supplier that granted a downstream purchaser the right to trade its stock on the
basis of nonpublic information recoups the trading losses of its shareholders
through adjustments in the supply contract. In the above example, Ford may
pay more for a prototype that offered it the possibility of trading profits on its
supplier's stock. The adjustment mechanism would in a sense be the same as
that which would reduce the salary of employees who are given rights to
143. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 874 ("[W]ith respect to insider trading, the
actions of a key executive of a firm do not differ in principle from those of a key supplier to
the firm.").
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traditional insider trading. 144  The analytics of upstream or downstream
relationships are the same whether or not the supplied good or service is secret
or represents cutting-edge technology: All that is required is that the
relationship provides the possibility of trading profits. We began this paper
with the example of an Intel executive having information as to the sales of
personal computers (downstream relationship) and sales of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment (upstream relationship). The upstream supplier's
price might be higher or the downstream customer's price might be lower to
offset the losses the investors in these firms would suffer if Intel contracted for
the right to profit from trading on nonpublic information. 145
Even in a world of perfect contracting, there may be cases in which
information rights are given without adjustment in the price of supplies. A
thinly traded company with hard-to-value technology may believe its stock is
undervalued and, as a result, find it hard to raise capital directly through the
equity markets, or human capital through the grant of stock options to key
employees. Such a company may welcome supplier purchases that support its
stock price; the fact that such purchases may cement relationships between
itself and its new stockholders and therefore strengthen the supply relationship
may be seen as an added bonus.
Of course, there will still be many situations in which trading of one firm's
stock by its privity substitute firms (or those firms' employees) will not be
jointly beneficial. In some cases, a firm may fimd it advisable to contract with
downstream or upstream firms to limit the ability of those firms (and executives
in those firms) from using nonpublic information to profit from trading in its
stock. For example, the company that produces assembly line manufacturing
equipment for Ford may require Ford to agree that neither it nor its employees
will use information about the equipment to profit from trading that company's
stock. There is anecdotal evidence that such contractual limitations on the use
of proprietary data are common, at least in Silicon Valley.146 Indeed, we
conjecture that firms would only rarely agree to grant unlimited trading rights
to a privity substitute. Recalling Carlton and Fischel's realistic hypothetical of
a supplier breaching a contract where one firm profited by short selling another,
we believe that contracts that expressly granted substitute trading rights would
not grant the right of one firm to short the stock of a privity substitute.
144. If Ford itself does not trade but its employees do trade, the "correct" adjustment
would be two-fold: a higher price for the good tied to lower explicit wages. In practice,
however, we suspect (based on our earlier quasi-dominance conjecture) that Ford would,
absent self-dealing inefficiencies, be the more efficient trader.
145. Alternatively, the good might be expected to bring trading gains as well as trading
losses, with no net effect on pricing. For example, a customer of Intel such as Compaq
might expect that it would benefit as much from the information it learns about Intel as Intel
benefits from the information it learns about Compaq.
146. See also supra pp. 264-65 (discussing current corporate practice).
[Vol. 54:235
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 284 2001-2002
SUBSTITUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING
4. Trading on non-privity substitutes (i.e., rivals and complementors).
In theory, firms that are not in privity might contact with each other to
reach an efficient policy with respect to trading in each other's stock. For
example, if, as we suggest, substitute trading is apt to be inefficient but (in most
cases) legal, AMD and Intel might contract with each other to prohibit cross-
trading in each other's stock-at least such trading that makes use of material
nonpublic information. The companies might also contract to prohibit
employee trading in the other company's stock. In practice, this sort of
contract would raise nearly insurmountable information, monitoring and
transaction costs. Among other things, companies would have to estimate and
value the future prospect of substitute trading in either direction; and
companies would find it nearly impossible to monitor whether the other
company or its employees were complying with a trading ban (on material
nonpublic information).
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our analysis suggests substitute trading is apt to be inefficient and that in
non-privity situations we cannot rely on companies to contractually limit such
trading to those cases in which trading enhances welfare. For policy purposes,
our analysis raises four sets of questions: (1) Is it economically or practically
feasible to determine the stock substitutes for any given company? 2) What
disclosure rules would be appropriate for regulators, investors and employees?
(3) What substantive changes in the law might be required and how might they
be implemented? and 4) What cognate securities restrictions are affected by
trading in stock substitutes?
A. Defining Stock Substitutes
The first step in regulating or even studying the real world practice of
trading in stock substitutes is to come up with a workable definition of stock
substitute, that is, a definition that can produce for each company a set of
companies that serve as stock substitutes. This is a daunting task, because as in
antitrust market definition, the definition of trading substitutability is one of
degree; in some sense, the movement of virtually every stock is correlated with
virtually every other stock. We outline below a set of definitions and
compilation rules that we believe will produce a list of the most significant
stock substitutes for most companies. Our approach will require virtually no
additional social resources, and can easily be incorporated into the disclosure
regime we recommend.
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1. Suppliers and customers.
Rule SK currently requires a firm to report in its Form 10-K filing (as part
of its "description of business") a customer name "if sales to the customer by
one or more segments are made in an aggregate amount equal to 10% or more
of the registrant's consolidated revenues and the loss of such customer would
have a material adverse effect on the registrant and its subsidiaries taken as a
whole." 147 We would expand this rule to also require firms to identify those
firms that supply goods or services representing more than 10% of the firm's
non-labor expenditure. The disclosure of a firm's major customers and
suppliers would go a long way toward identifying an important class of privity
substitutes-i.e., those external firms to which the disclosing firm is vulnerable.
These rules would not, however, identify the class of firms that are vulnerable
to the disclosing firm. To understand why this is the case, imagine a small firm
that sells a high proportion of its output to a large company such as Intel. The
firm might well be a source of trading gains for Intel or its employees. Its
fortunes might be tied to Intel's fortunes, or purchasing decisions by Intel. Any
system that required disclosure of purchases in stock substitutes would want to
require Intel or its employees to disclose purchases in the smaller firm. A
waivable default prohibition on trading in stock substitutes might require Intel
to include this firm on a list of "prohibited investments" to its employees-at
least under circumstances in which the employees could not trade in Intel stock.
The difficulty is that the smaller firm would not be listed in Intel's SK
because it did not account for 10% of Intel's supplies. However, the smaller
firm would list Intel as a 10% customer on its SK. The SEC could at virtually
no cost send Intel a computer-produced list of all companies that listed Intel in
their SK; these companies, together with the companies Intel lists in its SK,
could constitute a list of suppliers and customers for which substitute trading
might prove profitable.
2. Rivals.
Deriving a list of non-privity substitutes (chiefly, rivals and
complementors) is difficult because it requires a disclosing firm to identify
firms with whom it does not have contractual arrangements. Rule SK currently
does not require firms to disclose their rivals' identities-unless the rival is a
"dominant" firm in the industry.14 8 However, a list could easily be compiled at
the administrative level by requiring each firm to list the four digit SIC code for
147. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (2001).
148. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (2001) ("Generally, the names of competitors
need not be disclosed .... Where, however, the registrant knows or has reason to know that
one or a small number of competitors is dominant in the industry it shall be identified.").
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its industry; the SEC could produce a list that for each firm would contain the
other firms with that same SIC classification.
3. A quantitative definition of stock substitutions.
The lists described above-of customers, suppliers, rivals and
complementors-are intended to tell us which firm is a substitute for another.
There is another, and in some ways superior, method of making that
determination: The SEC might determine, for each company, a list of other
companies whose abnormal returns have a statistically significant correlation
with the abnormal returns of the reporting firm. The abnormal returns of a
stock are simply the changes in the stock's value on a particular day that cannot
be explained (using the Capital Asset Pricing Model) by general market
movements. 149 This statistical correlation alternative to defining a firm's stock
substitutes would be to regress the abnormal returns of other publicly traded
firms on the abnormal returns of the reporting firm (plus a constant) to see if
there is a statistically significant positive or negative correlation. Under the
semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, this regression
would tend to show whether publicly disclosed information that unexpectedly
moved the reporting company's stock also tended to move the price of another
firm's stock. As emphasized above, particular kinds of information might
induce positive correlations between two rivals' values, while other kinds of
information might induce negative correlations between the rivals' values.
Hence, the foregoing regression might be under-inclusive-because some firms
on average may have no average positive or negative correlation, even though,
for insiders, particular types of information could be expected to have
predictable positive or negative effects. 150 While this statistical alternative
would require the estimation of many alternative regressions-one for every
other publicly traded firm-this task could easily be centralized and performed
by the SEC or its designate. The individual regressions are trivial, and while
there are thousands of permutations that would need to be estimated, the job
could be handled by a single individual with a medium-sized workstation.
149. Abnormal returns and similar "CAPM" regressions are discussed in RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INvESTMENT
124, 194 (1993).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19 (discussing event studies showing that
one firm's unexpected increase in costs tended to produce negative correlation in its rival's
stock price, while one firm's unexpected increase in demand tended to produce a positive
correlation in its rival's stock price). One way the aforementioned regression might be made
less under-inclusive would be to test whether the absolute value of another firm's abnormal
returns was correlated with (the absolute value of) the abnormal returns of the reporting firm.
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4. Other possibilities.
It would be easy to supplement lists compiled from the above-described
sources. For example, the SEC could compile, for every company within a four
digit SIC code, a list of suppliers and customers listed by other companies
within that same code. This would produce, as a potential stock substitute for
Compaq, a company such as Motorola, which produces processors for Apple
(but not Compaq).
We might finally require reporting firms to disclose the names of all other
firms whose activities (success or failure in the market) are likely to materially
affect the profitability of the reporting firm. This list could be combined with a
list of firms that had named the reporting firm in this fashion to form a
qualitative set consisting of possible stock substitutes.
B. Disclosure Rules
1. Disclosure offirm policy.
An appropriate disclosure policy would require firms to state whether they
had (1) granted or denied permission to their own employees the right to trade
substitute stocks (on the basis of material nonpublic information); or (2) opted
to retain the right to trade the stock of specific related firms (on the basis of
material nonpublic information).151
This disclosure rule would clarify the legality of trading for employees. As
noted above, the law governing employee trading in stock substitutes in the
absence of contractual permission or prohibition is unclear. Our disclosure
policy would force each firm to outline its policy and in that manner remove
the ambiguity. Under existing law, employee trading in stock substitutes is
illegal in firms that explicitly ban such trading and legal in firms that allow
such trading. Our disclosure rule would simply force firms to announce their
policy.
Our disclosure rule would also provide information to investors. As noted
above, in the absence of a coordination rule, even inefficient stock substitute
trading might well be in the interests of shareholders. But such employee
trading may dramatically increase compensation to management; investors
therefore should know whether management receives trading rights. Investors
151. This disclosure rule would represent a kind of "affirmative choice" default-
forcing the disclosing firm to make an affirmative choice or face a penalty for remaining
silent. Alternatively, one might argue in favor of a default prohibition (which would infer
from a reporting firm's silence that it had not granted trading permission to itself or its
employees). But for clarity sake, we prefer the affirmative choice default as it eliminates the
need of reading the entire disclosure document to learn whether the firm has opted out.
[Vol. 54:235
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 288 2001-2002
SUBSTITUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING
may also want to know whether, and to what extent, such trading constitutes a
component of investment returns.
Perhaps most importantly, disclosure will provide policymakers with
information as to industry practice.
2. Disclosure of trades.
While ex ante disclosure of trading policy will provide important
information to policymakers and investors, ex post disclosure of trading results
would provide much more useful information. Rule 16b currently requires
certain statutorily defined insiders and major stakeholders to disclose, ex post,
their trading on their firm's own stock. Rule 16 could be amended to require ex
post disclosure of their trading-how many shares and at what price-on stock
that had been previously identified by their employer as a stock substitute.
Disclosure of such trading (whether or not on the basis of material nonpublic
information) would help assess whether this form of compensation was
excessive in relation to the reduction in the employee's salary. It would also
give the firm, its shareholders, and policymakers a much greater insight into
whether the potentials for substitute trading abuse (chiefly, externalized
negative effects, deleterious internal conflicts of interest and uncompensated
self-dealing by managers) were empirically important.
The ex post disclosure rules described above could be modified in one of
two ways. First, to the extent disclosure is intended to guide policymakers, the
rules might be applied only to a sampling of firms or industry. On the other
hand, at least in technology industries, where information might be located
below top management, disclosure could be extended to a greater subset of
employees than those covered by 16b.
3. Disclosure of the implicit value of stock trading as executive
compensation.
If a firm does grant its employees the right to profit from trading on its
privity and non-privity substitutes (and duly reports it as required in the
previous section), it might be worthwhile to also require the firm to estimate the
value of the trading right as part of the executive compensation reporting
requirement. 152 As detailed above, a firm/employer has an absolute right to
152. Currently, detailed rules govern the disclosure of executive compensation. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.402 (2000). Corporations are required to disclose the compensation of"(i) [a]ll
individuals serving as the registrant's chief executive officer or acting in a similar capacity
during the last completed fiscal year... regardless of compensation level; (ii) the
registrant's four most highly compensated executive officers other than the CEO," and other
individuals as well in some circumstances. Id. § 229.402(a)(3). "Compensation," is defined
broadly to include "all plan and non-plan compensation." Id. § 229.402(a)(2). Therefore,
under the current rules, any arrangement--"whether or not set forth in any formal
Nov. 2001 ]
HeinOnline -- 54 Stan. L. Rev. 289 2001-2002
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
prohibit such trading under O'Hagan. A firm's failure to prohibit the trading
can give rise to huge potential profits for the manager. Such profits were
vividly illustrated by the managerial profits reaped by a Cisco manager. 153 If
Henry Manne is correct that granting managers the right to trade on inside
information results in reduced salaries, 154 then it is important for this trading
option to be valued so that the market can better value whether managers are
being appropriately compensated.
But contrary to Manne's argument, we believe it will be exceedingly
difficult for a firm to accurately price the substitute trading option. We would
therefore insulate such disclosure from any private litigation and would only
allow the SEC to find a disclosure violation if the firm did not exercise due
diligence in making their estimate. To the extent that the substitute trading
rights had a seasoned track record, the firm would be required to relate the
expected future value, to the demonstrated past profitability on such trades.
C. Changes in Substantive Law
The proposals outlined thus far would leave the decision to allow substitute
trading with the firm that possesses, or whose employees possess, material
nonpublic information. However, our analysis suggests that substitute trading
is apt to be an inefficient practice. The costs and gains of substitute trading are
externalized, and there is likely to be too much substitute trading. This Article
is the first to examine substitute trading in any length and the first to offer any
thoughts on the efficiency of such trading. We are too realistic to believe that a
single paper is likely to (or even should) lead to fundamental change in the
securities law. However, the direction in which our analysis points is clear:
Serious consideration ought to be given to placing limits on substitute trading.
Our analysis, if confirmed, suggests that corporate trading on material
information in a stock substitute should be illegal unless the trading firm had
permission from the firm whose stock was being traded. 155 The rule would
documents"--involving, among other things, cash, stock, stock options, stock appreciation
rights, warrants, convertible securities and similar instruments needs to be disclosed.
Instructions to Items 402(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2000).
One wrinkle to the disclosure rules is that corporations may exclude some executive
officers from the disclosure requirement if their compensation in a particular year is
"unusual," i.e., when "the distribution or accrual of an unusually large amount of cash
compensation (such as a bonus or commission) ... is not part of a recurring arrangement and
is unlikely to continue." Id. Nonetheless, the rules make it quite clear that exclusion is
appropriate only in "limited circumstances." Id. Furthermore, trading in stock substitutes, to
the extent that it occurs in some industries, cannot fairly be said to be outside of "a recurring
arrangement" that "is unlikely to continue." Id.
153. See Simpson & Thurm, supra note 84; see also supra Part III.
154. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-41 (1966); see
also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 5, at 862-83 (analyzing insider trading as a form of
compensation scheme).
155. An alternative approach would be to adopt a variant of the pretrade disclosure
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give each firm a negative property right that would enable the firm to prevent
trading in its own stock.156 Presumably, the firm would grant trading rights in
those cases in which the trading is on balance efficient. Employee trading
rights would follow from employer rights and the rule outlined in Part V.B,
above. Employees could trade if employers could trade and if their employers
had announced a policy which permitted such trading.
While granting the traded firm a negative property right to block substitute
trading is theoretically more consistent with the goal of finding a
decisionmaker who internalizes the costs and benefits of substitute trading, our
less ambitious recommendation that the trading firm must merely disclose that
it or its employees might engage in future substitute trading is likely to move us
toward a more efficient equilibrium. Substitute trading by firms themselves
may not be a large risk because ofthe huge liquidity demands discussed above,
and we predict that the majority of firms would not grant their employees
unrestricted rights to engage in substitute trading.' 
57
D. Other Possible Changes in Substantive Law
I. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Our analysis also has implications for other aspects of Section 10(b) and
Rule 1 Ob-5. One of these implications has been discussed in Part IV.A, above.
Our analysis of "traditional" insider trading suggests that the present
prohibition be replaced by a default prohibition waivable by the firm. The firm
would also be given the right to allow its employees to trade. Because we
conclude that trading by employees is unlikely to be efficient and management
approval of such trading raises self-dealing issues, we would subject employee
trading to the scrutiny afforded under the duty of loyalty standard.
A second implication revolves around the "material misstatement" clause
of Section 10(b). As is perhaps obvious, a material misrepresentation by a
corporation or its officers may affect the stock price of other companies. In a
world in which substitute trading becomes popular, one of the purposes of such
misrepresentation may be to affect the prices of other companies' stocks. A
system that Jesse Fried has proposed with respect to other forms of insider trading. See
Fried, supra note 107, at 305-92.
156. A more aggressive proposal would be to extend the negative property right to all
trading on material nonpublic information. This prohibition would include trading done by
analysts or other outsiders. See Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalized Outsider Trading
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
157. Subjecting such permission to self-dealing scrutiny and potentially pricing the
value of this trading right as a component of executive compensation may further deter the
grant of such trading permission.
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person who makes a misstatement about one firm and then profits from trading
on another firm should face civil liability.
The predictable tendency of related firms' stock prices to move based on
particular pieces of information also suggests a basis for extending fraud on the
market liability to what we call "fraud on a substitute." Imagine that a firm
(through its managers) intentionally misrepresents that it is about to win an
important patent race that it has been engaged in with a particular rival. The
impact of the misrepresentation predictably would be to raise the stock price of
the misrepresenting firm and to reduce the stock price of its rival. Individuals
who purchased shares of the misrepresenting firm after the misrepresentation
had been made but before its falsity had been public would (given certain pre-
conditions) have a strong "fraud on the market" case against the firm for having
purchased at too high a price. 158 But what about the shareholders of the rival
who sold during the interim period in which the rival's stock price was
artificially depressed? The same logic that undergirds "fraud on the market"
liability suggests that the firm or person making a misrepresentation should
also be liable for "fraud on a substitute" for the losses suffered by shareholders
of other companies whose stocks are affected by the misstatement. 159
Finally, adoption of any substantive limitations on stock substitute trading
will require a (somewhat obvious) amendment to the definition of what
constitutes material information. In traditional insider trading, the company
whose stock is traded is the same company that is trading or whose employees
are trading. When stock substitutes are traded, it is necessary to determine
whether information is material with respect to the trader's company or the
traded company. The correct rule, of course, is that materiality should be
defined with respect to the company whose stock is traded. Thus, for an
executive of Ford who is trading on a supplier stock, any restrictions on the
trade would require that the information upon which the trade is based be
material to the supplier.
2. Rule 14e and Section 16(b).
Our analysis also has implications for at least two other sections of the
securities laws, Rule 14e-3 and Section 16(b). Presently, 14e-3 prohibits any
person from using nonpublic information traceable to a party making a tender
offer from purchasing the stock of the target of the tender offer. 160 But it does
158. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Ayres, supra note 119, at 995.
159. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174-78 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a misrepresentation by a merger partner may support civil liability to
shareholders of other partner to merger if, inter alia, there is a sufficient nexus between
misrepresentation and loss).
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2000). "'Rule 14e-3(a) is a disclosure provision. It
creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard
to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the
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not currently prohibit any individual from profiting on this nonpublic
information by trading on firms that are related to the target of the tender offer.
Thus the same information that cannot be used to purchase the target of a
tender offer can be used to purchase other firms in the same industry-even
though in many cases it will be easy to predict how the merger announcement
will impact the value of the legally traded firm.16 1 The same rationale that
supports Rule 14e-3 may support extending its reach to stock substitutes.
Section 16(b) requires insiders to surrender profits realized from short-term
investments in their company's securities; the rule is designed as a prophylactic
measure, on the assumption that such profits are likely to be due to nonpublic
material information. If future analysis supports our conclusion that substitute
trading is apt to be inefficient, and limitations on that trading are imposed,
consideration should be given to extending the reach of 16(b) disgorgement to
trading in stock substitutes.
At present, we do not advocate substantive limits on trading in stock
substitutes; even if limits are imposed, it is not clear that the above-described
extensions of the limits are desirable. It may be, for example, that the
aggressive role of the plaintiff's bar, together with the transaction costs
involved, make even the current administration of civil penalties for material
misstatements excessive. If that is the case, extension of 10(b) liability to
shareholders of other firms, while analytically appealing, is unnecessary and
socially wasteful. Strong objections can also be made to extension of 14e-3
and 16(b) liability. 162 Our central point, however, remains: In an increasingly
sophisticated economic marketplace, the securities law must be concerned not
only with transactions in a given stock but in substitutes for that stock.
information."' United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 669 (1997) (quoting United States
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (1991) (en banc)) (emphasis in original).
161. In some cases, an industry participant may expect the traded firm to rise in value
due to oligopolistic pricing or the now-increased prospect that the traded firm will itself be
acquired; in other cases, increased competition by the soon-to-be-combined firms may create
an expectation that the traded firm will fall in value.
162. Rule 14e-3 was adopted in response to the decision in Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), in which an employee of a financial printer traded on information in
the possession of his employer. The facts in Chiarella would now give rise to liability under
the misappropriation doctrine; this is true for most 14e-3 cases. Rule 14e-3 still has some
residual power; for example, it prohibits an "innocent" eavesdropper from trading on an
upcoming tender offer. The Rule may perhaps be justified on efficiency grounds: Tenders
are an important means of removing entrenched but underperforming management, and
trading in advance of a tender may raise the price the offeror must pay to acquire control.
Trading on a stock substitute affects the tender offer only derivatively (for example, to the
extent an increase in stock substitute price increases the price of the subject of the tender
offer). In other respects, trading on a stock substitute in advance of a tender seems similar to
"garden variety" outsider or analyst trading. It is unclear, therefore, whether there is an
efficiency grounds to ban such trading. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the efficiency
effects of analyst or outsider trading).
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CONCLUSION
Under current law, employees cannot use material nonpublic information
to trade in their employer's stock; an employer cannot use such information to
trade in its own stock. In many cases, however, that same information can be
used to profitably trade on the stock of other companies. Employers may trade
in stock substitutes without legal restrictions. The treatment of employees is
less clear. The opportunities for profit in such trading seem substantial, and
there is evidence that such trading is common, at least among employees.
Surprisingly, our analysis suggests that trading in stock substitutes is apt to
be less efficient than traditional insider trading. Costs and benefits of
traditional insider trading are apt to be internalized to the firm permitting or
undertaking such trading; costs and benefits of trading in stock substitutes are
externalized. There is no reason to think that an efficient amount of trading
will occur, and under plausible assumptions, there will be too much trading in
stock substitutes.
We suggest ways in which the stock substitutes for a given company can
be compiled at virtually no cost and recommend a set of ex ante disclosure
rules for firms and ex post disclosure rules for persons trading in stock
substitutes. The disclosure rules should clarify the law for employees, and
provide valuable information for investors and policymakers. We also describe
substantive legal changes that might limit trading in stock substitutes and
describe changes in related provisions of the securities law. We hold off
recommending adoption of these substantive rule changes until more is learned
about the extent of trading in stock substitutes and the policymaking
community has a chance to respond to our analysis.
Finally, while this Article has focused primarily on the legal implications
for informational trading substitutes, along the way we have contributed to
traditional insider trading theory more generally. Our thought experiment of a
hypothetical auction suggests that firms will often be better placed to trade on
insider information than their employees, because firm-level trading of its own
stock does not give rise to the perverse incentive effects of managerial insider
trading. This quasi-dominance result suggests that, under a default regime,
implicit or explicit agreements allowing managers to trade their own stock (on
the basis of material nonpublic information) should be strictly scrutinized for
both procedural and substantive fairness as a suspect self-dealing transaction.
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